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THE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE (NOT TO SAY RACE) OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
SHERI LYNN JOHNSON*
[A] rose [b]y any other name would smell as sweet.1
On this record, the removal of the last two Latmo jurors for
what in the end is simply their proficiency in the Spanish lan-
guage, should not be sanctioned.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In Batson v. Kentucky,' the Supreme Court held that racial dis-
crimination in the exercise of the peremptory challenge violates
the Equal Protection Clause.4 But what is racial discrimination in
this context? Even as Batson was announced, Justice Marshall ex-
pressed doubt that the procedure established by the Court would
be adequate to identify the prohibited discrimination.5 In Her-
nandez v. New York,' a case that has generated remarkably little
academic interest, the Supreme Court gave a partial answer to this
question: at least in a case with Spanish speaking witnesses, strik-
ing Latino jurors based on their proficiency in Spanish does not
constitute racial7 discrimination.8 That answer brings into bold re-
lief the concerns raised by Justice Marshall.
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A., University of Minnesota, 1975; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1979.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RomEo AND JuL=T act 2, sc.2.
2. People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 629 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting), cert.
granted In part, 498 U.S. 894 (1990), and afl'd, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
4. Id. at 89.
5. Id. at 102-08 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also znfra notes 87-102 and accompanying
text.
6. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
7. Arguably a more precise reference to discrimination against Latinos is national origin
discrimination, however, because most courts lump the two together under the phrase racial
discrimination, I will do the same. As national origin is also a suspect class, the distinction
has no doctrinal consequences.
8. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867.
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I see race as the most pervasive and intractable single issue fac-
ing the criminal justice system in the foreseeable future. Undoubt-
edly, my prior work shapes this perception, but it is far from idio-
syncratic. Public polls-even before the Rodney King beating
case-reflect widespread public concern about criminal justice sys-
tem inequities.9 McCleskey v. Kemp" silenced constitutional dia-
logue about racially disparate results but, at least in theory, the
Court's decision in Batson encourages constitutional dialogue re-
garding race and procedure, or more precisely, dialogue concerning
the race of the decisionmakers. Thus I come back again and again
to jury selection.
The history of race and jury selection is a long one, yet it must
not be edited too sharply Dicta and ambiguities one might be
tempted to prune keep sprouting new leaves. The very first ques-
tion one would expect the cases to answer finds expression in the
subtitle of Barbara Underwood's recent article, Whose Right Is It,
Anyway?" Despite the primary nature of this question, I think any
fair reading of the case law must acknowledge that twined
throughout the jury discrimination cases are rationales relating to
the defendant, the juror, and the public. Underwood acknowledges
the tangled roots, and she argues for the adoption of an excluded
juror focus.' 2
By contrast, this Article focuses on the defendant's claim that
race-based jury selection denies her the equal protection of the
laws. Historically, the lion's share of the jury selection case law has
worried about the defendant," but it is not historical pedigree that
determines my topic. Though I would not dispute the excluded ju-
ror's claim which Underwood champions, I find it vastly less com-
pelling than the defendant's claim. Ultimately, my interest in ra-
9. See, e.g., Black and White: A Newsweek Poll, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1988, at 23 (finding
that 34% of whites and 66% of blacks believe the U.S. justice system treats black people
charged with crimes more harshly than white people charged with crimes).
10. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that because Georgia's capital punishment law did not
discriminate purposely against the black defendant, the State had not denied the defendant
equal protection of the laws).
11. Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right
Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725 (1992).
12. Id. at 742-50.
13. See infra discussion parts II.C., II.D.3.
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cially just outcomes (thwarted from direct assertion by McCleskey)
makes me deem this claim the one worth pursuing.
This Article will argue that although Hernandez is wrong, the
decision is neither aberrational nor a throwback, but is directly
traceable to the questions left unanswered by Batson. Indeed, the
widely celebrated Batson progeny, those cases which extend Bat-
son's duties to new parties and circumstances, suffer from the
same disease as does the family scapegoat, Hernandez. Without a
direct answer to the question of what racial discrimination is in
this context, the family cannot be saved-or is not worth saving.
Part II reviews the background of the race and jury selection issue,
critically describing the progression of cases with a focus on the
effects on defendants of color. Part III attempts to discern the def-
inition of racial discrimination implicit in the Batson progeny,
then broadens the lens a bit to ask whether that definition can be
defended, either by reference to defendants' interests or by refer-
ence to some other interest, and concludes that it cannot. Part IV
offers an alternative conception of racial discrimination in jury se-
lection, and considers some implications of that conception for the
law of peremptory challenges.
II. THE HISTORY OF RACIALLY MOTIVATED EXCLUSION OF JURORS
The representativeness of a particular jury depends upon both
the selection of the venire panel and the selection of prospective
jurors from that panel.14 Though all jury selection law is plagued
with confusion about the underlying right, the histories of those
two selection processes have been very different. The former has
been the subject of congressional and judicial concern for more
than a century,15 while the latter process was unconstrained until
the 1986 decision of Batson v. Kentucky,"6 and even today is regu-
lated far less stringently.
14. See tnfra discussion parts H.A., ll.B.
15. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
16. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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A. Background: The Ventre Selectin Cases
In 1875 Congress prohibited the race-based exclusion of any
qualified citizen from jury service 17 and in 1880, Strauder v. West
Virginia' held that a state statute excluding black people from
jury service violated the black defendant's right to equal protec-
tion.19 Prominent in the Court's reasoning was the threat of white
racism. "It is well known that prejudices often exist against partic-
ular classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors,
and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of
those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others en-
joy ",20 In 'a related vein, Strauder spoke of equality between de-
fendants, and concluded that the law does not protect equally if
"every white man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from per-
sons of his own race or color, or, rather, selected without discrimi-
nation against his color, and a negro is not."'21
Strauder contains language referring to the effect on the ex-
cluded jurors, language that commentators and later opinions cite
to support a juror's right not to be excluded on the basis of race.22
To impose such an interpretation on this language, however, re-
quires chopping off the end of the sentence, for Strauder referred
to the effects on the juror to explain how these effects translate
into harm for the black defendant:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly
denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration
of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are citi-
zens and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferi-
ority, and a stimulant to the race prejudice which is an impedi-
17. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 243
(1988)).
18. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
19. Id. at 308.
20. Id. at 309.
21. Id.
22. Professor Underwood is more forthright about this language than are the Court's later
opinions. She acknowledges that Strauder mentions the injury to jurors "not as the central
rights violation in the case, but rather as an additional reason for recognizing the defend-
ant's personal right to equal protection." Underwood, supra note 11, at 743.
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ment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others.23
Strauder did not discuss the injury to jurors as the source of a
separate and distinct rights violation, and in the next 100 years of
criminal jury selection case law, even bare references to the injury
to black jurors vanished.24 Until Batson, the only Supreme Court
case that invoked injury to excluded jurors was an isolated civil
case brought by black potential jurors seeking an injunction.25
Thus with a fairly clear focus on the defendant, the Court soon
extended its ruling in Strauder to the exclusion of grand jurors on
the basis of race26 and the racially discriminatory administration of
facially neutral petit jury selection laws. Although the impact of
the early cases was limited due to stringent requirements for show-
ing purposeful discrimination,2 from 1935 on, the Court steadily
eroded those requirements. In Norris v. Alabama,29 the Court held
that a showing of the existence of a substantial number of black
citizens in the community, coupled with their total exclusion from
jury service, sufficed to shift to the state the burden of proving
that the exclusion did not flow from discrimination. In Norris,
the Court declared that this burden could not be satisfied by gen-
eral denials that no one was excluded on the basis of color or asser-
tions that qualified black persons were not known to the jury com-
missioners."' Next, the Court extended the burden-shifting rule of
23. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308 (emphasis added).
24. Perhaps the original mention of the juror was prompted in part by the egregiousness
of her exclusion. The administrative discrimination at issue in later cases places less of a
"brand" upon the jurors than did the statutory discrunmination noted in Strauder
25. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); cf. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that race is unrelated to fitness as a
juror).
26. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
27. See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
28. See, e.g., Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278, 282 (1909) (stating that because "the negro
race was not intentionally or otherwise discriminated against in the selection of the grand
and petit jurors," the defendant's conviction should stand); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S.
592 (1896) (holding that the defendant's motion to quash the indictment on the ground that
blacks were excluded from the grand jury could be sustained only by independent evidence
of purposeful exclusion).
29. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
30. Id. at 594-95, 598.
31. Id. at 598-99.
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Norris to cases of gross underrepresentaton 2 Then the Norris
rule was applied to cases in which substantial disparity existed be-
tween percentages of minority group members in the population
and on the jury list, provided the proponent of the discrimination
claim could show that at least part of the disparity originated at a
point in the selection process "where the jury commissioners in-
voked their subjective judgment rather than objective criteria." 3
Finally, in 1977 the Court held that a defendant established the
burden-shifting prima facie case of racial discrimination by noth-
ing more than a showing that the vicinage population was 79.1%
Mexican American but that only 39% of the persons summoned
for grand jury service were Mexican American.3 4 That same year
the Court declared the jury selection cases to be aberrational dis-
criminatory purpose cases.3 5 Ordinarily, statistical proof must pre-
sent a "stark" pattern to suffice as proof of discriminatory intent,
but "[b]ecause of the nature of the jury-selection task we have
permitted a finding of constitutional violation even when the sta-
tistical pattern does not approach [such] extremes." '36
Thus, venire selection law comes close to assuring the defendant
a "representative" venire. It does nothing for the defendant who is
tried in an area where few members of her race reside; the Court
has been adamant that no defendant has a right to a jury of any
particular composition."' For defendants accused of crimes in areas
with substantial minority populations, however, venire selection re-
quirements produce a venire likely to contain a significant number
of jurors who are not biased against them.
32. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (holding that a prima facie case of
discrimination, which the state had the burden to overcome, was established where 60 pro-
spective jurors were empaneled in a rape case, and not one of those prospective jurors was
black).
33. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970).
34. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-96 (1977).
35. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.13 (1977).
36. Id., cited with approval in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293-94 (1987).
37. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972) (explaining that the Constitu-
tion forbids only the "systematic exclusion of identifiable segments of the community from
jury panels and from the juries ultimately drawn from those panels"); Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313, 323 (1880) (asserting that "a mixed jury is not essential to the equal protec-
tion of the laws" and, hence, is not guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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B. Swam v. Alabama
Judicial treatment of the racially motivated selection of individ-
ual jurors has been far less sympathetic to fairness concerns. Al-
though in the venire selection cases the Court maintained that the
exclusion of minorities impairs the jury system's impartiality and
legitimacy, it took more than a century for the Court to recognize
that those concerns had any implications for the selection of par-
ticular jurors. 8 Dicta in even the earliest venire selection cases
suggested the Court's disinterest in the selection of individual ju-
rors,3" and in Swain v. Alabama40 the Court held that it was "per-
missible to insulate from inquiry the removal of Negroes from a
particular jury on the assumption that the prosecutor is acting on
acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying, the par-
ticular defendant involved and the particular crime charged."'41
Swain, unlike the venire selection cases, contains no expression of
concern for, or outrage on behalf of, the defendant tried by a ra-
cially hostile jury.42
The Court unanimously held that no valid claim arose from the
fact that Swain's prosecutor had used his peremptory challenges to
eliminate all six black jurors from Swain's jury 4 The Court rea-
soned that the function of the peremptory challenge could be per-
formed only if each side could act upon hunches and characteris-
tics, such as race, normally irrelevant to legal proceedings; "[f]or
the question a prosecutor. . must decide is not whether a juror
of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but whether
one from a different group is less likely to be."' 44 The parallel rea-
soning from the venire selection cases-that white jurors were
more likely to be "partial" than black jurors, thus denying black
38. See discustion infra part HI.C.
39. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880) (stating that the consti-
tutional question is not whether one has a right to a jury composed "in whole or in part of
persons of Is own race or color").
40. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
41. Id. at 223.
42. Although the Court noted that no black person had been on a jury in Talladega
County "since about 1950," the Court simply asserted that the "petitioner has not laid the
proper predicate for attacking peremptory strikes." Id. at 226.
43. Id. at 210-11, 221-22.
44. Id. at 220-21.
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defendants the equal protection of the laws45-seems to have en-
tirely eluded the Court.
Swain also claimed that prosecutors in his county had used their
strikes systematically to prevent black people from serving on ju-
ries.41 On this issue the Court was divided. The majority agreed
that if the defendant could prove that regardless of the crime, the
defendant, or the victim, the state sought to remove black people
from juries, this would subvert the purpose of the challenge and
would raise a Fourteenth Amendment claim. 41 Then the Court
held that Swain had not met this burden because he had not
proven that the prosecutor alone was responsible for the absence
of black jurors from all civil and criminal cases in his county 48
Three justices dissented on this point, objecting that the defendant
had made out a prima facie case under the venire selection case
standard by virtue of his proof that no black person had ever
served on a jury in that county 4
Over the next twenty years, no lower court found that the Swain
standard had been satisfied.5 0 Adhering to the Court's rationale,
they deemed evidence that prosecutors repeatedly had struck
black jurors in black defendant cases irrelevant.51 A stream of
harsh commentary, mostly student notes, followed Swam.5 2 Slowly
this resistance found judicial voices, first in dissenting opinions,5"
then in maverick uses of the federal supervisory power,54 and fi-
nally in state court decisions interpreting state constitutions.5 The
Supreme Court steadfastly refused to revisit Swam until the Sec-
45. See supra discussion part II.A.
46. Swam, 380 U.S. at 202.
47. Id. at 224.
48. Id. at 226.
49. Id. at 228-47 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
50. Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611, 1658
n.240 (1985).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1659 n. 24 2 .
53. See, e.g., State v. Jack, 285 So. 2d 204 (La. 1973) (Barham, J., dissenting); State v.
Gray, 285 So. 2d 199 (La. 1973) (Barham, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Martin, 336
A.2d 290 (Pa. 1975) (Nix, J., dissenting).
54. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 1659 nn.246-47.
55. Id. at 1659-63 (discussing the cases of People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978),
and Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979), and their effects on other state
courts).
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ond Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of an impartial jury was violated by racially motivated
exercises of the peremptory challenge.5" Shortly thereafter, the
Court granted certiorari in Batson v. Kentucky 57
C. Batson v. Kentucky
Batson, an African American man, was tried and convicted by an
all-white jury 58 The prosecutor had used his peremptory chal-
lenges to strike four black persons from the venire." Upon defense
counsel's motion to discharge the jury on the ground that the pros-
ecutor had violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution, the trial judge opined that the parties were entitled
to use their peremptory challenges to "strike anybody they want
to," and denied the motion. 0 Before the Supreme Court, Batson
pressed his Sixth Amendment claim,"' but the Court decided the
case on equal protection grounds.
1. The Majority Opinion
Batson holds that the Equal Protection Clause "forbids the
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their
race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be una-
ble impartially to consider the State's case against a black defend-
ant. 6 3 The Court rejected Swain's two central premises, holding
that a prima facie case could be established through reliance on
the facts in the defendant's case alone,"4 and deeming unconstitu-
56. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted and judgment vacated,
478 U.S. 1001 (1986). For a more detailed description of the case, see Johnson, supra note
,50, at 1663-66.
57. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
58. Id. at 82-83.
59. Id. at 83.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 84-85 n.4.
62. In Batson, the Court expressly reserved the question of whether race-based peremp-
tory challenges violated the Sixth Amendment. See id. In 1990, the Court decided that there
is no Sixth Amendment violation. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (rejecting the
argument that the defendant had a right, under the Sixth Amendment, to be tried by a
representative cross-section of the community).
63. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
64. Id. at 95.
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tional the presumption that black vemrepersons will be biased in
favor of black defendants. 65
The Court first declared that" '[a] single invidiously discrimina-
tory governmental act' is not 'immunized by the absence of such
discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.'"6
Instead of building a record based on other cases, the defendant
could establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the
exercise of the peremptory challenge by showing that she was a
member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor had
exercised peremptory challenges to remove venire members of the
defendant's race."7 The defendant may rely on the fact that pe-
remptory challenges are a jury selection practice that permit dis-
crimination by [those] inclined to discriminate, 8 and "must show
that [those] facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an
inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the ve-
niremen from the petit jury on account of their race."' 9 Batson in-
structs trial judges to consider all relevant circumstances, including
the pattern of strikes and the questions and statements made by
the prosecutor during the jury selection process, in determining
whether the defendant has established a prima facie case. 0
Citing, and creating a formal symmetry to, the venire selection
cases, the opinion then declares that upon the establishment of a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the state to come forward
with a neutral explanation for disparate results. 71 While the expla-
nation for the challenge need not rise to the level justifying exer-
cising a challenge for cause, it may not rest upon a judgment that
the venirepersons would be partial to the defendant because of
their shared race.
Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to ex-
clude black persons from the venire on the assumption that
blacks as a group are unqualified to serve as jurors, so it forbids
65. Id. at 97.
66. Id. at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 n.14 (1977)).
67. Id. at 96.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 97.
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the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that
they will be biased in a particular case simply because the de-
fendant is black.72
Nor can the state's burden be satisfied by unadorned denials of
discriminatory motives and assertions of good faith.73 Having de-
clared the new right and the standards by which claims that the
right had been denied should be judged, the Court declined to go
further and formulate procedures for implementing these
standards.
Despite the overthrow of Swam and the prominent citation of
venire selection cases, Batson did not bring the peremptory chal-
lenge cases in line with the old venire selection cases. If congruence
was achieved, it was only through the muddying of the venire se-
lection waters. Batson stated clearly that the principles that forbid
discrimination in the selection of the venire "also forbid discrimi-
nation on account of race in selection of the petit jury ,,71 But what
are those principles? Rather than emphasizing the risk of prejudi-
cial determinations by racist white juries as Strauder quite clearly
did, 5 the Batson Court glossed over the nature of the harm that
black defendants suffer when black people are excluded from the
jury on the basis of their race.
Batson did hold that discriminatory jury selection violates the
defendant's right to equal protection "because it denies him the
protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure. '76 But after
describing the institution of the jury and its importance, the
Court said only that "[t]hose on the venire must be 'indifferently
chosen' to secure the defendant's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to 'protection of life and liberty against race or color
prejudice.' ",78 With no further explanation, the Court abandoned
the question of black defendants' interests, and moved on to other
harms.
72. Id. (citation omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 88.
75. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (invalidating a West Virginia stat-
ute, which excluded black jurors, as violative of equal protection).
76. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
77. Id. at 86-87.
78. Id. (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309).
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In Batson, the Court addressed both the "unconstitutional dis-
criminat[ion] against the excluded juror" 79 and the harm to the
"entire community ,,so In its discussion of the harm to the ex-
cluded juror, the Court overstated precedent by claiming that "[a]s
long ago as Strauder the Court recognized that by denying a
person participation in jury service on account of his race, the
State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded ju-
ror ,,Il Turning to the harm inflicted on the entire community, the
Court explained that racially exclusionary practices "undermine
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." 2 Again
citing Strauder, the Court declared that "[d]iscrimination within
the judicial system is most pernicious because it 'is a stimulant to
that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to [black
citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all
others.' ,,83 But in Strauder itself, the paraphrased language read
"individuals of the race," 4 and clearly referred to the black de-
fendants whose right the Court was analyzing! Moreover, when the
Court later turned to justifying the burdens the decision will place
on trial courts, it did not refer to the defendant at all, but reiter-
ated the public perception theme. "In view of the heterogenous
population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice
system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that
no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race."85
Thus, Batson underplays prior rationales relating to the defend-
ant's interest in nonracist determinations of his guilt and exagger-
ates precedent related to juror rights and community interests.
The terms of the Court's holding quite carefully refer to the right
of the criminal defendant to challenge the exclusion of "members
of his race."8 6 This language suggests a rationale that matches that
of the venire selection cases: protecting the criminal defendant
against racial bias. Yet the explication of the Court's reasoning is
79. Id. at 87.
80. Id. at 87-88.
81. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 87-88 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308) (paraphrasing in original).
84. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
85. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
86. Id. at 82.
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murky on this point. Because the murkiness is not a product of
prior case law, one suspects it is deliberate.
2. Justice Marshall's Concurrence
Justice Marshall concurred in the Court's conclusion that ra-
cially-motivated exercise of the peremptory challenge violates the
Equal Protection Clause, 7 but argued that the remedy the Court
proposed was inadequate to eliminate the prohibited discrimma-
tion.88 After reviewing data on the frequency with which the chal-
lenge had been exercised on racial grounds 9 and cases from states
that had adopted an evidentlary analysis similar to the Court's as a
matter of state law,90 Marshall concluded that the remedial analy-
sis was flawed in two ways.9 1 First, he predicted that defendants
often would fail to establish a prima facie case even when the pros-
ecutor had engaged in race-based behavior because the limited
number of minorities on the jury would make a sufficiently "fla-
grant" case impossible.92 Thus, prosecutors would remain free to
discriminate against minorities in jury selection "provided that
they hold that discrimination to an 'acceptable' level."93
Marshall's second objection was that even when a prima facie
case could be established, trial courts would not be capable of reli-
able assessment of the prosecutor's motives.94 Facially neutral rea-
sons for striking a juror are easy to assert and difficult to second-
guess. 5 Again citing state court examples, Marshall reasoned that
if flimsy explanations about speculated family relationships, de-
meanor, or general impression were sufficient to justify strikes,
then the protection announced by the Court could be illusory 96
Moreover, it is not only law-breakmg prosecutors who threaten the
announced right, but self-deceiving ones:
87. Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 102-03.
89. Id. at 103-04.
90. Id. at 105.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 106.
96. Id.
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A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead
hun easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is
"sullen," or "distant," a characterization that would not have
come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically. A judge's
own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept
such an explanation as well supported.9 7
These obstacles led Marshall to propose the elimination of the
peremptory challenge as the only effective means of preventing ra-
cial discrimination in jury selection. 8 The majority's response to
Marshall's concerns and his proposal is contained in a relatively
brief footnote, which expressed confidence in judges and prosecu-
tors and concluded: "[n]or do we think that this historic trial prac-
tice, which long has served the selection of an impartial jury,
should be abolished because of an apprehension that prosecutors
and trial judges will not perform conscientiously their respective
duties under the Constitution."9 9 The majority did not respond to
Marshall's telling rejoinder that, "[e]ven if all parties approach the
Court's mandate with the best of conscious intentions, that man-
date requires them to confront and overcome their own racism on
all levels-a challenge I doubt all of them can meet."'100
Marshall did not explicitly clarify or augment the majority ra-
tionale, but his opinion suggests a greater degree of concern for
just results than does the majority opinion. In part, this greater
concern is evident from the fact that superficially fair challenges,
ones that do not so obviously demean the juror or create the im-
pression of injustice, trouble Marshall while they do not seem to
disturb the majority The other evidence that his animating con-
cern is for unbiased determinations of guilt lies in his comments
about the defense's use of peremptory challenges. Marshall noted
that the "potential for racial prejudice" inheres in the defendant's
challenge as well as the prosecutor's,' 10 and argued that "[o]ur
criminal justice system 'requires not only freedom from any bias
97. Id.
98. Id. at 107.
99. Id. at 99 n.22.
100. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 108.
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against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his
prosecution.' "10o
3. The Dissents
The dissents in Batson sailed a quite opposite tack. Chief Jus-
tice Burger argued for the correctness of Swain.1°3 He noted the
importance of the peremptory challenge'0 and the mapplicability
of "unadulterated equal protection analysis" to peremptory chal-
lenges exercised in a particular case."0 5 He reasoned that notions of
rationality cannot be applied to " 'an arbitrary and capricious
right' "106 and that "a constitutional principle that may invalidate
state action on the basis of 'stereotypic notions' does, not explain
the breadth of a procedure exercised on the 'sudden impressions
and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare
looks and gestures of another.' "107
Burger's opinion also made a slippery slope argument. He con-
tended that if equal protection analysis is applied in the case it
must also be applied to challenges based on classifications other
than race and to challenges exercised by defense counsel-results
he considered extremely undesirable. 08 Burger further complained
of "the return of racial differentiation" as "[p]rosecutors and de-
fense attorneys alike will build records in support of their claims
. . . by asking jurors to state their racial background and national
origin for the record, despite the fact that 'such questions may be
offensive to some jurors and thus are not ordinarily asked on voir
dire.' "109 Apparently Burger believed that racially differentiating
action is not problematic; but rather, it is speaking the word that
is costly.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent pointed out that neither the majority
nor the dissent in Swain doubted that case-specific use of race was
102. Id. at 107 (quoting Hayes v. Missoun, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
103. Id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 121-23.
105. Id. at 123.
106. Id. (quoting Swam v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
107. Id. (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 124.
109. Id. at 129 (quoting People v. Motton, 704 P.2d 176, 180 (Cal. 1985)).
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constitutional. 110 In his view, a view that resonates to this reader
with the old "equal application""'1  and "separate but equal"'12
doctrines,
there is simply nothing "unequal" about the State's using its pe-
remptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury in cases in-
volving black defendants, so long as such challenges are also
used to exclude whites in cases involving white defendants, His-
panics in cases involving Hispanic defendants, Asians in cases
involving Asian defendants, and so on. 13
"Indeed," he wrote, "given the need for reasonable limitations on
the time devoted to voir dire, the use of [group affiliations as]
'proxies' [for potential juror partiality] by both the State and the
defendant may be extremely useful 114 Of course, permitting
such "useful" reciprocal discrimination would have wildly unequal
results. Given the majority status of whites, it would be the rare
case in which a prosecutor could use peremptory challenges to en-
sure that a white defendant faced a jury from which all whites had
been excluded. Whether this inescapable fact did not occur to or
did not matter to Justice Rehnquist is not clear.
D. The "Breadth" of Batson: Powers, Edmonson, and McCollum
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts are known neither for their
expansion of criminal procedure rights,"15 nor for their activism on
the racial justice/equal protection front (at least not when minori-
ties' equal protection rights are involved)."6 For those on the left,
110. Id. at 135 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (rejecting the equal application doctrine in
a case involving a statutory scheme to prevent interracial marriages).
112. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (rejecting the separate but equal
concept as applied to racially segregated schools).
113. Batson, 476 U.S. at 137-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Eventually, the Court explic-
itly rejected this argument on the ground that "[iut is axiomatic that racial classifications do
not become legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree."
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991).
114. Batson, 476 U.S. at 138-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
115. For example, both Courts have restricted the federal habeas corpus remedy. See
Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (Rehnquist Court); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107 (1982) (Burger Court).
116. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (limiting the
availability of race-based remedial action).
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Batson is the bright spot in both fields, and, despite the two Chief
Justices' objections, it has spread like a brushfire."7
It is true that the Court initially cabined the peremptory chal-
lenge cases to the Equal Protection Clause. In the 1990 case of
Holland v. Illinois,"5s the Court found that the Sixth Amendment
did not prohibit racially motivated exercises of the peremptory
challenge."19 Holland was a white defendant who objected to the
exclusion of black vemrepersons, 20 but his choice of doctrine, and
not his race, thwarted his claim. In Holland, five members of the
Court suggested that Holland might have prevailed had he raised
an equal protection challenge, 2 ' and in Powers v. Ohio, 2 decided
the following year, seven members of the Court so held. 123
1. Powers v. Ohio
The majority in Powers first observed that Batson was intended
to serve several ends, "only one of which was to protect individual
defendants from discrimination in the selection of jurors.' 1 24 Bat-
son, according to the Powers majority, also recognized harms to
the excluded jurors and to the community 125 This characterization
of Batson, hotly disputed by the dissent, prefaced the Court's
holding that peremptory challenges based on race violate the
venireperson's equal protection right not to be excluded from jury
service on the basis of race.' 26 The Court concluded that the crinmi-
117. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (holding that a white defendant
could object to race-based exclusions of black jurors under the Equal Protection Clause).
118. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
119. Id. at 478.
120. Id. at 475.
121. See id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 490 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at
504 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
123. Id. (Kennedy, J., delivering the majority opinion and joined by Justices White, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter).
124. Id. at 1368 (citing Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1370 ("An individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit
jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race.").
Cf. id. at 1379 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disputing the existence of a juror's right not to be
excluded from a jury on the basis of race).
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nal defendant, regardless of race, satisfies the three criteria for
third party standing to assert the venireperson's clain. 12 7
Two of the criteria for third party standing are relatively un-
problematic. First, the criminal defendant has the requisite "close
relation to the third party" that motivates effective advocacy be-
cause discrimination in the jury process selection may lead to re-
versal of the defendant's conviction. 128 Second, the third party is
hindered from protecting her own rights because of the impossibil-
ity of being heard at the time of her exclusion. I29
More problematic, as Justice Scalia argued in dissent, is the "in-
jury in fact" requirement.1 3 0 The majority found this requirement
met because "[t]he overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury
panel, casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and
indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the
cause."' 1 Whether or not one approves of the outcome in Powers,
it must be acknowledged that this somewhat stretches the "injury
in fact" standard.1 1 2 One suspects that a very large number of liti-
gants who have been denied third party standing could have made
an analogous claim. As Justice Scalia phrased it,
Every criminal defendant objecting to the introduction of some
piece of evidence or to some trial procedure on the ground that
it violates the rights of a third party can claim a similar "per-
ception of unfairness," but we deny standing. "Injury in percep-
tion" would seem to be the very antithesis of "injury in fact. '133
127. Id. at 1370-74.
128. Id. at 1372.
129. Id. at 1373. The Court also noted the difficulty of obtaining declaratory or injunctive
relief given the requirement of a showing of likely recurrence of the individual juror's exclu-
sion based on race and the prohibitive costs of a damages suit given the small financial stake
involved. Id.
130. See td. at 1379-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1371.
132. See Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Re-
alism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 419, 433 (1992) (approving
of the result in Powers, but characterizing the opinion as "aggressive resort to third-party
standing"). For comment on the generally restrictive nature of third party standing law, see
Henry P Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1984); Marc Rohr,
Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party Standing and Moot-
ness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MiMmI L. REv. 393 (1981).
133. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1379 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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To my mind, the unspoken conundrum for the majority was how
to avoid the cost of recognizing the real injury. There is real injury
to the defendant, but part of the murky reasoning of Batson might
seem to preclude its acknowledgement. The prosecutor struck the
black juror and the defense objected to that strike because both
sides were convinced that a black juror would be more favorable to
the defendant. The real injury is the loss of that presumptively
more favorable juror. But Batson states that the Equal Protection
Clause forbids a strike premised on the assumption that black
venirepersons "will be biased in a particular case simply because
the defendant is black."' ' The meaning and purpose of that state-
ment must be dissected. If it is a specific example of the more gen-
eral principle that any inference about a juror's likely bias based
on her race is both false and constitutionally impermissible, then
the lost juror in Edmonson3 5 cannot be characterized as presump-
tively favorable.
The other plausible interpretation of that statement from Bat-
son would not preclude recognizing the real injury, but it has its
own costs. If the statement means only what it says-that black
jurors may not be deemed biased in cases involving black defend-
ants-that may be because it is white jurors who can and should
be deemed biased, or who are at least at greater risk of being bi-
ased, in cases involving black defendants. This interpretation com-
ports with the earlier venire selection cases, but requires a defini-
tive choice of rationale, a choice the Court m Batson seemed
reluctant to make. It is also in some tension with the Court's re-
peated statements that the defendant is not entitled to a jury of
any particular composition. I will turn to that tension in Part IV,
but note for now that a satisfactory response to Justice Scalia
would require directly confronting that tension. The somewhat
strained construction of injury-through-perception avoids that un-
pleasant prospect, at least for the moment.
Thus, Batson purported to offer new protection to defendants,
protection from prosecutorial action that excludes racially similar
jurors on the basis of their shared race. Powers supposedly pro-
tected jurors from exclusion on the basis of their race, and at least
134. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
135. See infra part ILD.2.
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at first glance, Powers seemed to have the effect of expanding the
defendant's Batson right to encompass all exclusions of jurors
based on race. But the contortions of Powers are disquieting, for
reasons that become clearer with the subsequent cases.
2. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company
I now depart from the chronological sequence of the cases, post-
poning discussion of Hernandez v. New York.' I do this largely
because Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.' 37 and Georgia v. Mc-
Collum,138 like Powers, but unlike Hernandez, can be deemed an
"expansion" of Batson. Just as third party standing doctrine was
used to "broaden" Batson to cover the racially motivated
prosecutorial exclusion of racially dissimilar jurors, state action
doctrine has been used to "broaden" Batson beyond its original
application to prosecutors' challenges.139
The Batson majority was careful to note that it was expressing
no view on whether the Equal Protection Clause constrained the
exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel. 40 Before the
Court addressed that issue directly, it decided Edmonson,141 deter-
mining that a private litigant in a civil case may not use peremp-
tory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of their race.'42 Pri-
vate parties, of course, ordinarily are not constrained by the Equal
Protection Clause,'143 but where the government so dominates an
activity that the participants must be deemed to act with the au-
thority of the government, those parties are subject to the con-
stramts applicable to the government.144 The first requirement for
finding state action, that the claimed constitutional deprivation re-
sulted from the exercise of a right or a privilege having its source
136. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
137. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
138. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
139. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2077 (addressing an action by a private party rather than an
explicit "state action").
140. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12 (1986).
141. ll S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
142. Id. at 2077.
143. See id. at 2082 ("The Constitution's protections of individual liberty and equal pro-
tection apply in general only to action by the government.").
144. Id.
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in state authority,1 5 the Court found easily satisfied, reasoning
that peremptory challenges owe their existence to legislative au-
thorizations.146 Regarding the second requirement, that the private
party could fairly be described as a state actor, 47 the Court con-
cluded that a civil litigant's attorney exercising a peremptory chal-
lenge could be so described.1 48 In support, the Court cited the
"overt, significant" participation of the government m jury selec-
tion, 49 the quintessentially governmental nature of the jury sys-
tem,150 and the exacerbation of injury due to its location in a
courthouse.1 51
Justice O'Connor's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, first noted with regret the disarray of the state
action cases,1 52 and then disputed both the assertion that the gov-
ernment participates in a significant way m the peremptory chal-
lenge1 53 and the claim that a traditional governmental function is
involved.'" O'Connor narrowed the lens, and argued that the gov-
ernment's participation in the peremptory challenge itself is lim-
ited to the judge advising a juror that he or she has been ex-
cused.1 55 The evidence of the government's participation in the rest
of the jury selection process she deemed irrelevant.15 6 Similarly,
she argued that the peremptory challenge, as opposed to the func-
tioning of the jury system as a whole, should be examined in deter-
mining the presence of a traditional governmental function.1 57 This
narrowed focus led her to find the challenge an obviously private
function.1 58 After careful comparisons to other recent state action
145. Id. at 2082-83 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
146. Id. at 2083.
147. Id. (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2084 (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478
(1988)).
150. Id. at 2085.
151. Id. at 2087.
152. Id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2090.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 2092-94.
158. Id.
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cases, most of which the majority did not address, 15e O'Connor
deemed the case "fairly well controlled"'160 by Polk County v. Dod-
son.61 In Polk County, the Court held that a public defender em-
ployed by the state does not act under color of state law when rep-
resenting a defendant in a criminal trial. 162
The digression of a lengthy analysis of state action doctrine is
not necessary It suffices to say that, while a reader predisposed
toward the outcome in Edmonson might find it a permissible rul-
ing under the prior state action cases, she would be hard pressed to
maintain that those cases mandated it. 63 Again we see Batson
spreading in a way that neither the logic of Batson itself nor prece-
dent from other doctrinal areas would seem to require.
Edmonson has one other interesting aspect. Despite the fact that
Edmonson was black and the jurors whose exclusion he challenged
were black, 64 the Court analyzed the case as a denial of the
ventreperson's rights,165 concluding that civil parties also had a
sufficient interest in the outcome of the proceeding to warrant
third party standing. 66 The only right the majority discussed was
the prospective juror's right, and any right as a litigant-the right
that the Batson holding recognized and the right with a century-
long pedigree-had disappeared. If Powers appeared to expand the
Batson right, after Edmonson it seems more precise to describe the
right as transformed. That the transformation was not without
cost becomes more apparent in the next state action case, Georgia
v. McCollum. 67
159. Id. at 2093-94.
160. Id. at 2094.
161. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
162. Id.
163. See Neuborne, supra note 132, at 447 (approving the result in Edmonson, but
describing Justice Kennedy's opinion as not compelled by the state action case law, but
"swni[ming] against the formal current").
164. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
165. Id. at 2080.
166. Id. at 2088.
167. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
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3. Georgia v. McCollum
In McCollum, the State charged the white defendants with a ra-
cially motivated assault on two African Americans. l6 8 When the
State moved to prevent the defendant from exercising peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, the trial court de-
nied the motion, but certified an immediate appeal. 16  The Su-
preme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision, distm-
guishing Edmonson as a civil case, and relying on the importance
of the free exercise of the peremptory challenge to protect criminal
defendants. 17 0 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the Equal Protection Clause "prohibits a criminal defendant
from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race
in the exercise of peremptory challenges.' ' 7 1
The majority opinion m McCollum addressed four questions.172
The first question was "whether a criminal defendant's exercise of
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner inflicts
the harms addressed by Batson."'7' Citing Powers as support for
the proposition that Batson was intended to serve multiple ends,
only one of which was protection of defendants from discrimma-
tion,17 4 the Court determined that "the extension of Batson in this
context is designed to remedy the harm done to the 'dignity of per-
sons' and to the 'integrity of the courts.' ,,15 The Court reasoned
that regardless of who challenges the juror, the harm is the same;
the juror is subjected to "open and public racial discrimination.' ' 7 6
Primary attention, however, went to the harm to the commu-
nity. 77 The Court reasoned that one of the goals of the jury system
is to impress on the defendant and the community that a verdict is
lawful and fair, and that selection procedures that exclude African
168. Id. at 2351.
169. Id. at 2352.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2359.
172. Id. at 2353.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1990)).
176. Id.
177. Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986)).
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Americans from juries undermine that public confidence.178 More-
over, the "need for public confidence is especially high in cases in-
volving race-related crimes."17 9 Because "emotions in the affected
community will inevitably be heated and volatile[, p]ublic confi-
dence in the integrity of the criminal justice system is essential for
preserving community peace ))180 The Court then cited an ar-
ticle describing the "public outrage and riots" that followed the
trial of two white defendants accused of a racial beating who were
acquitted by a jury from which all African American jurors had
been struck."1 With these remarks, the Court completed the evolu-
tion away from the root concern of racial justice to the distant fruit
of the appearance of justice, seemingly important now for its law
and order function.
To answer the second question, whether the defendant properly
can be considered a state actor when she exercises the peremptory
challenge,8 2 the Court turned to the rationale used m Edmonson
to find the private litigant exercising peremptory challenges to be a
state actor. 8 The Court scored the criminal defendant the same
on all three of the Edmonson criteria, the extent of reliance on
governmental benefits, the performance of a traditional function,
and the aggravation of the injury by the incidents of governmental
authority 8 4 The Court then determined that the adversarial rela-
tionship between the defendant and the prosecution does not ne-
gate the governmental character of the challenge.8 5 It distm-
guished the Polk County public defender case 8 6 by explaining that
the Court in Polk County had not held that the adversarial rela-
tionship completely precluded the finding of state action, but only
determined that the relationship precluded a finding of state ac-
tion based upon public employment alone.18 7
178. Id. at 2353-54.
179. Id. at 2354.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citing Albert Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Vor Dire, Peremp-
tory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 195-96 (1989)).
182. Id. at 2355.
183. Id. (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., l1 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991)).
184. Id. at 2355-56.
185. Id. at 2356.
186. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
187. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356-57.
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The third question addressed by the Court in McCollum was
whether the prosecutor had standing to raise the claims of the po-
tential jurors.18 8 The Court answered. that the state incurs harm
when doubt is cast upon the fairness of its judicial process.18 9
Again, as in Powers and Edmonson, the harm to the state is the
percewed injustice and not an unjust outcome. The Court rea-
soned that the state's connection to the jurors is sufficiently close
because it is the "logical and proper party to assert the invasion of
the constitutional rights of the excluded jurors in a criminal
trial."1 190 Moreover, as in Edmonson and Powers, the Court found
that "the barriers to suit by an excluded juror are dauntmg," thus
precluding her from raising her own claim. 91
Finally, the Court asked "whether the interests served by Batson
must give way to the rights of a criminal defendant,"' 92 and con-
cluded that they need not.193 After noting that the peremptory
challenge does not have constitutional status, 94 the Court opined
that its decision would not "undermine the contribution of the pe-
remptory challenge to the administration of justice."1 5 In sharp
contrast to its earlier remarks on the importance of public percep-
tions of fairness,"' the Court declared that " 'if race stereotypes
are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair' '[that]
price is too high to meet the standard of the Constitution.' "'1n1
With indignation, the Court then announced that "[i]t is an affront
to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the right to discrimi-
nate against a group of citizens based upon their race." 198
Without alluding to the objection it was addressing, the Court
then offered the following lecture:
188. Id. at 2357.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991)).
192. Id. at 2357-58.
193. Id. at 2358.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2357; see also supra note 189 and accompanying text.
197. McCollum, 111 S. Ct. at 2358 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S.
Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991)).
198. Id. at 2358.
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We recognize, of course, that a defendant has the right to an
impartial jury that can view him without racial animus, which so
long has distorted our system of criminal justice. We have, ac-
cordingly, held that there should be a mechanism for removing
those on the venire whom the defendant has specific reason to
believe would be incapable of confronting and suppressing their
racism.1
99
The reader who is familiar with the line of cases the Court cited
must protest that these remarks are disingenuous at best. Though
a mechanism exists for "removing those whom the defendant
has specific reason to believe would be incapable of confronting
and suppressing their racism,"200 this mechanism, voir dire on ra-
cial prejudice, generally is not available to the defendant!20 1 The
Court cited Ham v. South Carolina,°2 a 1973 case in which it held
that a bearded black civil rights worker charged with possession of
marijuana was deprived of due process when the trial court refused
to question the panel concerning racial prejudice. 20 3 The Court in
McCollum failed to mention the severe limitations subsequently
imposed on this right.
In Ristaino v. Ross,2 °4 the Court ruled that Ham did not an-
nounce a universally applicable rule, but "reflected an assessment
of whether under all of the circumstances presented there was a
constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning
about racial prejudice, the jurors would not be [impartial]. 20 5 The
fact that Ross was a black man accused of committing violent
crimes against a police officer "did not suggest a significant likeli-
hood that racial prejudice might infect Ross' trial"206 and thus did
not require a question concerning racial prejudice.0 In Turner v.
Murray,"' the Court reaffirmed this holding with regard to guilt
199. Id. at 2358-59 (citing Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992); Rosales-Lopez v.
United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973)).
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., id. at 2361-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
202. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
203. Id. at 525-26, 529.
204. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
205. Id. at 596.
206. Id. at 598.
207. Id.
208. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
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adjudications, including capital cases, anid modified Ross only to
the extent of requiring voir dire on racial prejudice in a capital
sentencing proceeding in which the underlying offense was an in-
terracial one.2 9 Thus, the constitutionally-mandated right to vour
dire on racial prejudice is extremely narrow. Moreover, even when
voir dire is required, it may be ineffective in probing racial bias
because questions generally are sharply limited in number and
sometimes are addressed to the entire venire rather than to mdi-
vidual jurors.21°
The Court also cited Rosales-Lopez v. United States,2 1 1 a case of
little practical importance. In Rosales-Lopez, a federal supervisory
power case, the Court denied relief to a defendant requesting voir
dire on prejudice against persons of Mexican descent in an illegal
212immigration case. The minimal protection provided by Rosales-
Lopez derived from the plurality's view that in the federal courts,
as a matter of federal supervisory power, in cases involving violent
interracial crimes, a question concerning racial prejudice should be
permitted.1 3
Why did the Court make this dubious foray into voir dire law?
The Court in McCollum continued its lecture:
But there is a distinction between exercising a peremptory chal-
lenge to discriminate invidiously against jurors on account of
race and exercising a peremptory challenge to remove an mdi-
vidual juror who harbors racial, prejudice. This Court firmly has
rejected the view that assumptions of partiality based on race
provide a legitimate basis for disqualifying a person as an im-
partial juror. As this Court stated just last Term in Powers,
"[w]e may not accept as a defense to racial discrimination the
very stereotype the law condemns." "In our heterogenous society
policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against
the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court
of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of
birth, or the choice of religion." We therefore reaffirm today
that the exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based
209. Id. at 33-38.
210. See generally Johnson, supra note 50, at 1674-75 (noting cases and commentary).
211. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
212. Id. at 183, 194.
213. See id. at 189.
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on either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by
the party.21 4
The most interesting, disturbing, disheartening, and outrageous
aspect of this paragraph is its apparent resolution of one of the
ambiguities in Batson. Batson repeatedly referred to the imper-
missibility of a presumption that black jurors were biased in favor
of black defendants.215 Here the Court generalized to the imper-
missibility of assuming any juror is more likely to be biased on
account of her race. This explicit generalization, foreshadowed by
Edmonson's adoption of an injury-in-perception theory of the
harm to the litigant,216 seems to encompass the disapproval of all
assumptions about the prevalence of bias in white jurors.
The concurrence of Justice Thomas2 7 and the dissent of Justice
O'Connor21s voice the objection to which the majority's lecture had
responded. It was not the particular facts of McCollum-white de-
fendants seeking to strike black venirepersons-that the majority
was attempting to ward off with its words, but rather the looming
shadow of the next case, indeed the looming shadow of white ra-
cism. Justice O'Connor's dissent actually posed a less drastic disa-
greement than Justice Thomas' concurrence. She accepted the cor-
rectness of Batson, but reiterated her dissent in Edmonson.219 She
also asserted that even if Edmonson was not to be overruled, Mc-
Collum was distinguishable for the reasons set out in Polk County
v. Dodson.220 The adversarial relationship between the government
and the accused precludes finding the accused a state actor.221
O'Connor noted that Dodson quite specifically stated that public
defenders are not vested with state authority "when performing a
lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a crimi-
214. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359 (alterations m original) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.
Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991); Ristaino v. Russ, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976)).
215. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
216. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087-88 (1991).
217. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359-61 (Thomas, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 2361-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 2361-63.
220. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
221. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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nal proceeding, ' ' 2 a holding that clearly encompasses the exercise
of the peremptory challenge.223
Justice O'Connor then observed that "[w]hat really seems to
bother the Court is the prospect that leaving criminal defendants
and their attorneys free to make racially motivated peremptory
challenges will undermine the ideal of nondiscriminatory jury se-
lection we espoused in Batson.'2 24 She objected that this preoccu-
pation ignores the fundamental tenet that the Constitution only
constrains the government,2 ' and then noted the "pragmatic" ob-
jection that the Court's holding may "fail to advance nondiscrimi-
natory criminal justice. '226
Justice O'Connor either mistook or disagreed with the majority's
conception of "nondiscriminatory criminal justice." She focused on
outcomes, not procedures, declaring that conscious and uncon-
scious racism can affect the way in which white jurors perceive mi-
nority defendants and evidence concerning those defendants'
guilt.227 Thus she reasoned that the use of peremptory challenges
by a minority defendant to secure some minority representation on
the jury "may help to overcome such racial bias, for there is sub-
stantial reason to believe that the distorting influence of race is
minimized on a racially mixed jury."22 Quoting the amicus curiae
brief filed by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,229 O'Connor ob-
served that some minority defendants may be denied all minority
jurors unless they are able to use their peremptories to strike
members of the majority race.230 Explicitly focusing on outcome,
she concluded that "[i]n a world where the outcome of a minority
defendant's trial may turn on the misconceptions or biases of white
jurors, there is cause to question the implications of this Court's
good intentions."2 31
222. Id. at 2361 (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)).
223. Id. at 2362.
224. Id. at 2363-64 (citation omitted).
225. Id. at 2364.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. (citations omitted).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment,3 2 ventured a more
radical disagreement. He agreed that Edmonson compelled the
majority's decision,233 but wrote to express his broad disagreement
with the Court's continuing attempts to constitutionally regulate
peremptory challenges.23 4 The course of his opinion suggests that
his disagreement extends beyond Edmonson to Batson itself.
Thomas started with Strauder's premise that the racial composi-
tion of a jury may affect the outcome of a particular case2 35 That
premise implies that "securing representation of the defendant's
race on the jury may help to overcome racial bias and provide the
defendant with a better chance of having a fair trial. 2 36 Because
conscious and unconscious prejudice persists in society, Thomas
asserted that Strauder's premise is not obsolete.237 Thomas then
noted that Batson departed from that premise by holding that
"without some actual showing, suppositions about the possibility
that jurors may harbor prejudice have no legitimacy ",238 Ulti-
mately, this departure results in "a serious misordering of our pri-
orities, 23 9 putting the rights of jurors foremost, and leaving de-
fendants with no means of protecting themselves from
unacknowledged racial prejudice. 40
Thomas noted the NAACP's amicus argument that "whether
white defendants can use peremptory challenges to purge minority
jurors presents quite different issues from whether a minority de-
fendant can strike majority jurors,"24' but commented "it is diffi-
cult to see how the result could be different if the defendants here
were black. ' 242 Thomas was therefore "certain that black criminal
defendants will rue the day that this court [sic] ventured down this
232. Id. at 2359-61 (Thomas, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 2359.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2360 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880)).
236. Id. (citation omitted).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 2360 n.2 (quoting Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
at 3-4).
242. Id. at 2360 n.2.
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road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of peremptory
strikes.124
3
In some ways, McCollum is but a small step from Edmonson.
Although the Court assigned itself four questions, only two could
have been decided differently given Edmonson. Moreover, two Jus-
tices unpersuaded by Edmonson, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Thomas, deemed it controlling on all questions.244 Yet because
McCollum makes the evolving inversion of priorities explicit, it is
significant. Faced with the choice between juror rights and defend-
ant rights, the majority did not blink.
That black defendants as a class will "rue the day" the Court
decided Batson seems unlikely If few prosecutors were exercising
peremptory challenges before Batson was decided, then, as a class,
black defendants indeed will be worse off than they were under
Swam, 2 " for then their attorneys were free to seek more, or at
least some, black jurors by striking white jurors. If, however, many
prosecutors exercised their challenges to strike black jurors, as ex-
tensive evidence suggests,246 then, as a class black defendants
should be better off under Batson cum McCollum than under
Swam. Because most venire populations are not predominantly
black, when a prosecutor and a black defendant's attorney with an
equal number of challenges are allowed to attempt to racially stack
the venire, most often it is the defendant who comes up short.
Obviously, what would be most beneficial for black defendants
as a class, indeed, for defendants generally, would be Batson with-
out McCollum, as O'Connor advocates.247 In any event, it is a
strange case that makes Justices O'Connor and Thomas the cham-
pions of defendant rights and the purveyors of discussion about
unconscious racism.
243. Id. at 2360.
244. See id. at 2359 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("I was in dissent in Edmonson v. Lees-
ville Concrete Co. But so long as it remains the law, I believe that it controls the dispo-
sition of this case ") (citation omitted).
245. Swam v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986).
246. See infra note 358 and accompanying text.
247. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 218-
226 and accompanying text.
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E. The Depth of Batson: Hernandez v New York
The foregoing analysis assumes that Batson is an effective prohi-
bition of racially motivated peremptory challenges, the assumption
that Justice Marshall decried in his concurrence in Batson.248 One
would expect that the Court, determined despite doctrinal obsta-
cles to apply a new rule to every trial in the entire legal system,
would be deeply invested in defining that rule. The Supreme
Court, however, has been interested much less in the application of
Batson than its applicability. Hernandez v. New York2 49 is the
only Supreme Court case that applies the Batson rule to a specific
fact pattern. Its outcome underscores the aptness of the brushfire
metaphor; Batson spread quickly and broadly, but what it burned
was insubstantial.
In the midst of the "expansionist" post-Batson cases, came a
case that only can be deemed a severe contraction.25 0 After the
prosecutor had excused the only four potential jurors with Latino
surnames, defense counsel for Hernandez moved for a mistrial, al-
leging discrimination under Batson.2 51 The prosecutor, without
waiting for a ruling on whether the defendant had established a
prima facie case of discrimination, offered his reasons for striking
the jurors. 25 12 With respect to two of the prospective jurors, he ex-
plained that they had brothers who had been convicted of crimes,
an explanation Hernandez did not dispute.5 3
Concerning the other two, after first asserting that he was "not
certain" that they were Hispanics, the prosecutor stated that his
reason for rejecting them was that he felt uncertain that they
would be able to listen to and follow the interpreter.
They each looked away from me and said with some hesitancy
that they would try, not that they could, but that they would try
to follow the interpreter, and I feel that in a case where the in-
248. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
249. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
250. The Court decided Hernandez less than a week before Edmon-son.
251. People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. 1990), af'd, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
252. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1864.
253. Id.
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terpreter will be for the main witnesses, they would have an un-
due impact upon the jury. 5
Later the prosecutor acknowledged that the jurors' "final answer"
was that they would listen only to the interpreter, but that he "just
felt from the hesitancy in their answers and their lack of eye con-
tact that they would not be able to do it. 2 55 After the trial court
denied the defense counsel's motion, the prosecutor added that
"there's no reason for me to want to exclude Hispanics because all
the parties involved are Hispanic, and I certainly would have no
reason to do that. 2 5 1 When defense counsel then charged that the
prosecutor had excluded Latino jurors based on fear that they
would have sympathized with the defendant, the judge responded
by noting that the victims' ethnicity argued against that
inference.257
The Supreme Court omitted from its opinions the fact that the
prosecutor limited his questioning concerning fluency in Spanish,
and consequently, ability to ignore the Spanish speaker for the
English translation, to the four jurors with Latino surnames.258
The reason the Court ignored this fact is unclear. Whatever the
reason, on a record including this discriminatory questioning, a
majority of the Court rejected the claim that the prosecutor's rea-
sons for excluding Latmo venirepersons amounted to the racial
motivation forbidden by Batson."9
Hernandez argued that, because Spanish language ability bears
such a close relation to ethnicity, exercise of the challenge on the
basis of that ability constitutes the discrimination forbidden by
Batson.260 Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion, joined by Rehn-
quist, White and Souter, demurred on this question, reasoning that
the prosecutor had not relied on language ability alone but had
pointed to the demeanor and responses of the individuals ques-
254. Id. at 1864-65 (citation omitted).
255. Id. at 1865 n.i.
256. Id. at 1865.
257. Id. at 1865 n.2.
258. See People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting)
("[There is no indication that any other members of the panel were also asked if they
spoke Spanish.").
259. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1862.
260. Id. at 1866-67.
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tioned, and that this reliance was race neutral, thus meeting the
first Batson requirement.261
The plurality deemed the stated reason "race neutral" because it
"rested neither on the intention to exclude Latino or bilingual ju-
rors, nor on stereotypical assumptions about" a suspect class. 262 In-
stead it divided potential jurors into two classes: those whose voir
dire conduct persuaded the prosecutor they might have difficulty
in accepting the translator's rendition of Spanish language testi-
mony and those whose testimony did not.26 Rather surprisingly
(particularly if one considers that the prosecutor only asked Latmo
jurors about their fluency in Spanish!) the opinion announced
"[e]ach category would include both Latinos and non-Latinos. ' '2
To the defendant's argument that any honest bilingual juror would
hesitate in answering similar questions, the plurality responded
that such disparate effects might be given weight in assessing for-
bidden intent, but did not bear on the question of facial
neutrality 261
The plurality opinion then addressed the question of discrinina-
tory intent, as it claimed Batson required.266 Because the trial took
place in a community with a substantial Latino population and
common knowledge suggests that a significant percentage of the
Latino population speaks fluent Spanish, the prosecutor's reason
raised "a plausible, though not a necessary, inference that language
might be a pretext [for racial discrimination]. ' ' 267 The trial judge's
decision to believe the prosecutor's race neutral explanation is sub-
ject to review under the deferential "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard.268 This standard is appropriate in part because findings will
"largely turn on evaluation of credibility, '2 9 and, the defendant's
261. Id. at 1866 ("At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prose-
cutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explana-
tion, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.").
262. Id. at 1867.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1867-68.
266. Id. at 1868.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1871.
269. Id. at 1869.
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contentions to the contrary, this standard of review is "reconcila-
ble" with the scrutiny given the older veire selection cases.270
Applying the clearly erroneous standard, the plurality found no
error.2 71 The Court described the challenged exclusions as based on
a "subjective criterion having a disproportionate effect on Lati-
nos, '2 72 but listed several factors that the trial judge could have
relied on as "evidence of the prosecutor's sincerity ,,273
Apart from the prosecutor's demeanor, the court could have
relied on the facts that the prosecutor defended his use of pe-
remptory challenges without being asked to do so by the judge,
that he did not know which jurors were Latinos, and that the
ethnicity of the victims and prosecution witnesses tended to un-
dercut any motive to exclude Latinos from the jury.274
The opinion also noted the prosecutor's "verifiable and legitimate"
explanation for excusing two of the Latino jurors and the fact that
only three of the challenged jurors "[could] with confidence be
identified as Latinos" as other factors the trial court might have
relied upon.27 5
At the end of the plurality opinion, after disposing of Mr. Her-
nandez's claim, the Court cautions the reader not to infer anything
either way about the permissibility of a peremptory challenge
based upon language ability per se:
In holding that a race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge
means a reason other than race, we do not resolve the more diffi-
cult question of the breadth with which the concept of race
should be defined for equal protection purposes. It may
well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that
proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be
treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analy-
sis. And, as we make clear, a policy of striking all who speak a
given language without regard to the particular circumstances of
the trial or the individual responses of the jurors, may be found
270. Id. at 1871 (referring to Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), and its progeny).
271. Id. at 1873.
272. Id. at 1872.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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by the trial judge to be a pretext for racial discrimination. But
that is not before us. 276
Thus, the prosecutor with no reason other than language facility
can, with a clear conscience, strike jurors based on language
facility 277
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the
judgment .2 7  If one had read O'Connor's opinion in McCollum 27 9
first, one might have expected her sensitivity to "unconscious ra-
cism"280 to prompt a dissent in Hernandez, or at least a shaky con-
currence. On the contrary, she chastised the plurality because it
"goes farther than it needs to in assessing the constitutionality of
the prosecutor's asserted justification for his peremptory
strikes. ' 28 1 One suspects that, although she did not say so, per se
language discrimination is not problematic for O'Connor. The as-
serted purpose of the strikes, to eliminate jurors who may not be
able to accept the official translation, "[n]o matter how closely tied
or significantly correlated to race" was itself not based on race. 282
Because "the trial court believe[d] the prosecutor's nonracial justi-
fication, and that finding [was] not clearly erroneous, that is the
end of the matter. '2 3 Perhaps Justice O'Connor thinks that only
laymen, not judges and lawyers, are susceptible to unconscious
racism.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, for reasons "essen-
tially" shared by Justice Blackmun,8 4 dissented.285 Justice Stevens
argued that, once the defendant establishes a prima facie case,
"[u]nless the prosecutor comes forward with an explanation for his
peremptories that is sufficient to rebut that prima facie case, no
276. Id. at 1872-73 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
277. Should the Court later decide that per se language discrimination does violate the
Equal Protection Clause, only cases still on direct appeal would be affected; others would be
insulated by the limited retroactivity of most criminal procedure decisions.
278. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1873-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
279. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2361 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 2364.
281. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1873 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
282. Id. at 1874.
283. Id. at 1875.
284. See id. at 1875 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 1875 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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additional evidence of racial animus" should be required."' Al-
though a facially neutral explanation is required to rebut discrimi-
2817natory purpose, a facially neutral explanation, even when be-
lieved, will rarely be sufficient to rebut discriminatory purpose
where that justification has a "significant disproportionate im-
pact. ' 288 This is because "disparate impact is itself evidence of dis-
criminatory purpose. '28 9 An exclusive focus on the prosecutor's
subjective state of mmd is erroneous, for discriminatory purpose
can be established "by objective evidence that is consistent with a
decisionmaker's honest belief that his motive was entirely be-
nign. 2 90 To require the defendant to provide additional, subjective
evidence of racial animus merely because a facially neutral reason
is given would render the Equal Protection Clause "vain and
illusory ,291
Applying those principles to the facts of Hernandez, Stevens
concluded that the prosecutor's explanation was insufficient to re-
but the prima facie case, whether or not it was pretextual.9 * It was
insufficient because of the confluence of three reasons: the inevita-
ble disproportionate effect on Spanish-speaking venirepersons; the
ease with which the prosecutor's concerns could have been accom-
modated without striking Latino jurors, namely jury instructions
or a physical arrangement permitting the jury to hear only the offi-
cial translation; and the fact that the prosecutor's concerns, if sub-
stantiated, would have supported a challenge for cause, which he
did not advance.293
For quite different reasons, neither the concurrence nor the dis-
sent commented on the list of reasons proffered by the plurality as
possible bases upon which the trial judge might have rested his
determination that the prosecutor was credible.294 Nevertheless, I
will comment on these reasons, for two related reasons. First, this
286. Id. at 1875.
287. Id. at 1875 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986)).
288. Id. at 1875.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1876.
291. Id. (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98).
292. Id. at 1876-77.
293. Id. at 1877.
294. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
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list is important in its signal to trial judges and attorneys. It con-
tains guidance for the argument and adjudication of all race-based
peremptory challenge issues, not just those that relate to language.
Second, an item-by-item evaluation bolsters the dissent's claim
that the plurality approach will render Batson "vain and
illusory ,,295
One must first note that of the six reasons cited by the court,19 6
only one, that the victims were also Latino, was in fact alluded to
by the trial judge as a reason for his decision.97 Thus appellate
review should be doubly generous, deferring to the ultimate con-
clusion and speculating as to the possible underlying reasoning.
Such post hoc imaginativeness provides no incentive for the judge
to report her own reasoning, and therefore no incentive to examine
it. If the Court were concerned at all about unconscious racism by
judges, appellate review that encouraged introspection would be
vastly preferable.
Moreover, the specific reasons cited by the Court as possible
support for the trial judge's decision are depressingly thin. The
first possible reason is demeanor," 8 which is necessarily unreview-
able. 99 Then there is the prosecutor's spontaneous defense of his
peremptory challenges without a request from the judge,300 a re-
sponse equally consistent with a guilty conscience, and one ex-
tremely easy for subsequent prosecutors to imitate, regardless of
their true purposes. Third on the list is the prosecutor's assertion
that he "did not know which jurors were Latino."30' 1 One must
wonder how this "fact" can constitute "evidence of the prosecu-
tor's sincerity, 3 02 when we only know it to be fact by dint of the
295. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
297. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1865 n.2. Even this reason is so garbled that the Court
characterized the judge's statements as "appear[ing] to accept" the prosecutor's contention
that he would have no motive to strike Latino jurors because the victims were also Latino.
Id. Moreover, all discussion of this factor occurred after the trial judge made his ruling. Id.
at 1865. It is hard to believe that the prosecutor's later assertions concerning his motives
influenced the earlier decision.
298. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
299. See Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1872 (stating that "of course [the Court has] no oppor-
tunity to review" demeanor evidence).
300. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
301. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1872; see also supra note 274 and accompanying text.
302. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1872.
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prosecutor's assertion. The fourth reason cited by the Court is
more complicated, but is also wrong. The ethnicity of the victims
and witnesses is said to "undercut any motive to exclude Latmos
from the jury."30 3 It is true that a case with a Latino defendant
and a white victim would present a prosecutor with an even
stronger reason to exclude Latino jurors, but the motivation may
also be present in a case involving a Latino victim and a Latino
defendant. Evidence concerning white racism demonstrates that it
has at least two relevant facets-a greater propensity to convict in
an other-race defendant case and a greater propensity to convict in
a same-race victim case. 4 Thus if a prosecutor were informed, he
would opt for the all-white jury in Hernandez as well as in a La-
tmo defendant/white victim case; if he were uninformed, one
hardly can guess what his reasoning might or might not be. The
message to prosecutors appears to be that discrimination in minor-
ity race victim/minority race defendant cases is nonreviewable, or
at least less reviewable.
The fifth reason, that only three struck jurors could with "confi-
dence be identified" as Latno,30 5 is bizarre considering that the
prosecutor struck all even arguably Latino jurors! How can any
positive inference be drawn from a lack of opportunity to discrimi-
nate further? Finally, the Court cited the fact that the prosecutor
had "verifiable and legitimate" reasons for two challenges as a rea-
son that might support the trial judge's determination.30 6 This fact
adds nothing probative. Perhaps the prosecutor would have dis-
criminated impermissibly against those jurors if he had had no
such "legitimate" reasons, perhaps not.
If prosecutors exist who have read Hernandez and cannot create
a "racially neutral" reason for discriminating on the basis of race,
bar examinations are too easy If judges exist who wish to believe
proffered "racially neutral" reasons and cannot rationalize that de-
sire, impeachment for incompetence ought to be more frequent.
Whatever you do, just don't say race. Don't even think about it.
303. Id., see also supra note 274 and accompanying text.
304. See tnfra notes 359-382 and accompanying text.
305. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1872; see also supra note 275 and accompanying text.
306. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1872; see also supra note 275 and accompanying text.
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III. THE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The title of this Article is intended to have two different, albeit
related, meanings. First, the title is intended to summarize my
view of what the practice of peremptory challenges will look like
after Hernandez: the attorney will not say race but will say some-
thing plausible-language, culture, associations, appearance, or
even demeanor-and she will say it with apparent sincerity; where-
upon the judge will rule that the prohibition against racial discrim-
ination in the exercise of the peremptory challenge is not violated.
This section focuses on the second meaning of the title: the con-
ventions of language and culture that underlie peremptory chal-
lenge law Why would the Court expand Batson's sweep while
thinning its broom?
A. The Commentary
The commentary on peremptory challenge law does not answer
or, for the most part, even pose the above question. The academic
response to Batson itself is overwhelmingly favorable. °7 Commen-
tators have embraced Batson's expansion through Powers and Ed-
monson with similar enthusiasm.30 8 Law review reaction to McCol-
lum has also been largely positive,309 with very few pro-defendant
307. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 132, at 419; Underwood, supra note 11, at 726-27;
Jon M. Van Dyke, Peremptory Challenges Revisited, 12 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 114, 123 (1991);
Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1920 (1992); Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of
Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517, 532-33 (1992); Note, Developments-Race
and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1473, 1575-76 (1988); E. Vaughn Dunnigan,
Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 355, 356-58 (1988); J.L. Harvancik, Comment, Georgia v. McCollun Elimi-
nating the Race-Based Peremptory Challenge Once and for All, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 257, 264
(1992); Mark L. Josephs, Note, Fourteenth Amendment-Peremptory Challenges and the
Equal Protection Clause, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1000, 1012 (1992); Michael M.
Raeber, Note, Toward an Integrated Rule Prohibiting All Race-Based Peremptory Chal-
lenges: Some Considerations on Georgia v. McCollum, 26 GA. L. REV. 503, 504-05 (1992);
Cynthia Richards-Rowland, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The New and Improved Peremptory
Challenge, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1195 (1987).
308. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 132, at 432-34; Underwood, supra note 11, at 726-27;
Bray, supra note 307, at 547-50; Josephs, supra note 307, at 1000.
309. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 307, at 552-53; Harvancik, supra note 307, at 258, 284-85;
see also Dunnigan, supra note 307, at 355 (suggesting that the defendant's peremptory chal-
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objections. 10 Only one scholarly commentator, Professor Kenneth
Nunn, has objected to the Powers-Edmonson-McCollum trio on
the ground that the three cases together have shifted focus away
from the black defendant. 1' His views on those three cases largely
are compatible with and have contributed to my own, but he does
not consider Hernandez or its connection to those cases.
A few commentators have argued that only Justice Marshall's
proposal to eliminate the peremptory challenge would prove ade-
quate to end discrimination in its exercise. 2  Recently, as observ-
ers have considered Batson's application in the lower courts, more
have expressed dismay at the justifications for peremptory chal-
lenges that have passed judicial scrutiny. These observers have not
proposed jettisoiing Batson, but instead suggest a variety of rules
to confine judicial discretion.3 13 Oddly enough, few of these com-
lenges should be as limited as the prosecutor's peremptory challenges); Raeber, supra note
307, at 508 (arguing for the actual result in McCollum before the case had been decided).
310. See Stuart Taylor, A Step Toward a Jury of One's Fears, LEGAL TIMEs, June 29,
1992, at 21; cf. Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory
Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARv. L. REv. 808, 811
(1989) (arguing that the defendant's actions do not amount to state action); Josephs, supra
note 307, at 1024-25 (arguing that the Court should not extend Batson to defendants).
311. Kenneth Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology, and the Peremptory Chal-
lenge, 28 HARV. CR-C.L. L. REv. (forthcoming 1993).
312. See, Bray, supra note 307, at 564; Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A
Half-Step in the Right Direction, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1026, 1039 (1987).
313. See, e.g., Alan Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementa-
tion of Batson v. Kentucky, 25 WH.LAME=rE L. REv. 293, 348-49 (1989) (advocating "sub-
stantial restrictions on both voir dire and peremptory challenges"); David D. Hopper, Note,
Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capri-
cious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. REv. 811, 836-38 (1988) (discussing the merits of limiting
the number of peremptory challenges for both prosecution and defense, punishing the pros-
ecutor for improper exercise of challenges, and mathematical or psychological testing to
evaluate defendants clam); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Note, Defense Presence and Participa-
tion: A Procedural Minimum for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99 YALE L.J. 187, 197-206
(1989) (proposing that defense counsel be afforded an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's
reasons for a peremptory challenge, and that hearings in which prosecutors testify under
oath as to the reasons for the peremptory challenge should be permitted m the discretion of
the trial judge); Paul H. Schwartz, Comment, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Im-
plementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1533 (1991) (mak-
ing several recommendations, most derived from other states' laws, to aid North Carolina
courts in the implementation of the Batson doctrine); Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's In-
vidious Legacy: Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Chal-
lenge, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 336, 361-66 (1993) (arguing that courts should not accept "soft"
reasons, e.g., intuition, for peremptory strikes, that all such strikes should be based on ju-
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mentators have pounced on Hernandez. Even bare descriptions of
Hernandez are relatively rare,314 and the student notes and articles
that actually comment on it are a very odd lot.
Only one article, written by Professor Juan Perea, focuses on
Hernandez.3 5 After examining the close connection between lan-
guage, Latino ethnicity, and race, he concludes that exclusion of
bilingual jurors is not race neutral and that Hernandez was there-
fore wrongly decided. Professor Perea also considers alternative
approaches to bilingual jurors and the broader social harms cre-
ated by Hernandez. Because his animating concern is the bilingual
juror, he does not address the implications of Hernandez for other
peremptory challenge cases.
Professor Martha Minow considers Hernandez briefly in the
course of a discussion regarding the conceptions of bias implicit in
Justice Thomas' confirmation hearings, 31 6 and she criticizes the
Hernandez Court for assuming that Spanish proficiency is abnor-
mal and problematic rather than enriching."' One student note
pursues this avenue of criticism at somewhat greater length; the
author argues that a juror's perceived inability to accept the offi-
cial translation is not disqualifying but desirable.318 Modern lan-
guage theory "recognizes that [listeners] shape facts according
to their own preconceived categories. 19 In this sense, bilingual ju-
rors are no less objective than the Spanish-iguorant juror who "in-
terprets" the official interpretation.320 Moreover, bilingual jurors
may have special value as a check on the quality of the official
rors' written or oral statements, and that attorneys should be required to strike all jurors
with the same "unacceptable" characteristics, regardless of race).
314. Cf. Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TULANE L. REV. 1267,
1327-28 (1992) (providing a two page description of Hernandez without comment); Alan B.
Rich, Peremptory Juror Strikes in Texas After Batson and Edmonson, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1055, 1067-68 (including a one paragraph description of Hernandez).
315. Juan F Perea, Hernandez v. New York. Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of Span-
ish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1992).
316. Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched By Experience: Bias
and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1201, 1210-12 (1992).
317. Id.
318. Sarah B. Clasby, Note, Understanding Testimony: Official Translation and Bilin-
gual Jurors in Hernandez v. New York, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 515, 528-34 (1991-
1992).
319. Id. at 529.
320. Id.
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translation.3 21 Another student note argues that Hernandez con-
firms the wisdom of Justice Marshall's concurrence in Batson in
which he argued that peremptory challenges must be eliminated
entirely 22 The third note, written in the course of a project eval-
ating lower federal court decisions interpreting Batson, comments
that Hernandez renders Batson "little more than an empty gesture
toward equal protection. '3 23
The only other article that comments on Hernandez is Barbara
Underwood's Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection:
Whose Right Is It Anyway?;124 and, alas, she praises Hernandez.
Underwood finds Hernandez "important because it demonstrates
the capacity of the Court, and of developing doctrine, to keep the
ban on jury discrimination within manageable limits. 3 25 She notes
that Hernandez's differentiation between impact and intent and
its deference to judicial factfinding both are consistent with her
view that Batson "protects not the parties' interest in the composi-
tion of the jury, or in verdicts, but rather the interest of the pro-
spective jurors in nondiscriminatory access to participation."326
Thus, Underwood is the only commentator who links the expan-
sion of Batson through third party standing and state action anal-
ysis with the curtailment wrought by extremely limited, formalistic
inquiries. For her, focus on the juror seems to answer the question
of why the Court would broaden Batson's sweep and thin its
broom. Before I turn to whether focus on the juror, or any other
focus, can justify that thinning, I will address the predicate ques-
tion: What does the Court think it is trying to sweep 9
B. Implicit Conceptions of "Racial Discrimination" in the Cur-
rent Case Law
Batson prohibits "racial discrimination" in the exercise of the
peremptory challenge just as Strauder prohibited "racial discrimi-
nation" in the selection of the venire. Strauder, however, led to
321. Id. at 532-33.
322. James S. Wrona, Note, Hernandez v. New York. Allowing Bias to Continue in the
Jury Selection Process, 19 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 151, 161-62 (1992).
323. Swift, supra note 313, at 356.
324. Underwood, supra note 11.
325. Id. at 767.
326. Id. at 768.
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rules that come close to assuring representative venires, whereas
Batson has thus far led to little more than a prohibition against
saying race when explaining nonrepresentative outcomes. In one
sense, this contrast is part of the larger question of the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause: Do we have a color-blind Constitu-
tion?327 But, I think a narrower question is more fruitful here, if
less elegant. Thus I will not survey "the taming of Brown"'3 2 but
will focus instead on the taming of Strauder
The Court never defines what it means by "racial discrimina-
tion" in the exercise of peremptory challenges. As noted earlier,
the vagueness and ambiguity of Batson's descriptions of the harm
it is attempting to redress suggest some early ambivalence and un-
certainty 329 One could consult two quite different authorities:
prior jury selection law and modern equal protection law.
Strauder, and most of its progeny, focused on the "prejudices
[that] often exist against particular classes in the community,
which sway the judgement of jurors. "330 In contrast, the bulk of
post-Brown equal protection law aims at the distinction between
intent and impact, requiring proof that actions were taken "be-
cause of, rather than in spite of" race.
Ironically, in this context, these two modes of analysis can be
reconciled-but only from one direction. In Part IV, I shall start
with Strauder and trace the implications of defining discrimina-
tion in this context, implications that can coexist with the intent-
impact distinction. The protesting opinions of Justices Thomas
and O'Connor in McCollum3 1 and the dissents of Justices Stevens
and Blackmun in Hernandez3 32 testify to the pull of Strauder
Nevertheless, the intent-impact paradigm has overshadowed
Strauder, determining all of the post-Batson cases and variously
327. See, most recently and notably, ANDREW KULL, THE COLORBLIND CONSTrTUTION
(i992). For a discussion placing the Powers-Edmonson-McCollum trilogy m the context of
that larger discussion, see Nunn, supra note 311.
328. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHL L.
REV. 935 (1989).
329. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
330. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880).
331. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); id.
at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
332. See Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1875 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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distracting three of the protestors33 3 away from the "prejudices
...which sway jurors."3 34
If actions taken "because of, not in spite of" race define racial
discrimination, then the step to the conclusion that color-con-
sciousness must be either avoided or overridden is small and easy.
The majority opinions in several of these cases attempt to avoid
such color-consciousness, as well as prohibit it. Powers avows the
Court's color-unconsciousness3 5 in the process of declaring that
the race of the defendant makes no difference in determining
whether a prosecutor may exclude black jurors from the defend-
ant's jury.336 Just as the prosecutor should not take action because
of the juror's race, the Court should not fail to take action because
of the defendant's race. In order to ignore the defendant's race in
Powers, the Court had to assert that Batson protected venireper-
sons' rights as well as defendants' rights.337 In Edmonson, the
Court followed the Powers rationale to new heights of color-uncon-
sciousness by ignoring the race of the black litigant and determin-
ing only the third party claim of the black excluded jurors.3 38 In
McCollum, the majority answered Justices Thomas' and
O'Connor's expressed concerns about the implications of the case
for black defendants obliquely through its reference to voir dire,33 9
refusing to even acknowledge the racially specific argument.
Thus the rubric "[j]ust don't say race" sometimes seems to ap-
ply to the Court itself. I think this odd application of the norm of
color-unconsciousness both flows from and reinforces some unex-
amined corollaries of that norm. Not surprisingly, those same, now
reinforced, corollaries then determine the outcomes in the cases.
The four corollaries I have in mind, whatever their truth in other
contexts, all turn out to be false when tested in the setting of a
criminal trial.
333. See id. at 1873 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2351 (Blackmun,
J.) (Justice Stevens joined the majority.).
334. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
335. I use the term "color-unconsciousness" both because I wish to sidestep the broader
debate about "color-blindness" and because I like its sting.
336. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991).
337. Id. at 1369.
338. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991).
339. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357.
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The first, and most basic, corollary of a color-consciousness defi-
nition of racial discrimination is that acknowledging or assuming
difference is wrong. First the "prejudice" of Strauder, the white
racism it presumes, becomes the more generic "bias" prohibited by
Batson. Next, because the assumption that black defendants are
different than white defendants is forbidden, we cannot assume
that white defendants are harmed less than black defendants by
the striking of black jurors. Therefore, the decision in Batson de-
termines Powers. Then we deduce that we cannot assume that a
black defendant is hurt by the removal of black jurors, for that
would imply a forbidden assumption that black jurors will decide
cases differently than will white jurors; hence the Edmonson ap-
proach, which throws away the equal protection right of the black
litigant in favor of the third party standing rights that had to be
recognized in Powers. But if any assumption of different decision-
making is invalid then the defendant really is not harmed by her
inability to strike jurors of another race. McCollum concludes that
she only thinks she is harmed, and we need not give deference to
such racist fears. Moreover, there is no reason to treat separately
the question of black defendants who desire to strike white jurors
and white defendants who wish to strike black jurors; there is no
(cognizable) difference.
Rather than prohibiting racism, this chain of reasoning prohibits
perceptions of difference, including perceptions of different levels
of racism. Although Hernandez is not determined by this "see no
difference" corollary, it fits comfortably with it.34 0 Hernandez is
compelled, however, by the three remaining corollaries. The second
corollary-that racial "bias," or assumption of difference, is un-
usual-necessarily is linked to the first: if racial bias were common
in criminal trials, the corollary prohibiting the acknowledgment of
difference would collapse, for assumptions of difference about the
judging of guilt would then be correct. On the other hand, if racial
bias is unusual, then Hernandez starts to make sense. Why would
an attorney strike jurors on the basis of their race? Either because
340. If we do not assume bias on the part of jurors based on their race, why would we
assume bias on the part of attorneys or judges? If the prosecutor tells us she is not biased,
why should we believe that she is? Certainly not because of the race of the jurors she struck!
This proves too much, of course. If all of the above is true, why does the Court require the
prosecutor to give any explanation at all?
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of her own bias, but that is rare, because of jurors' biases, but
those are also rare, or because she is stupid, which we can assume
is rare. Therefore, few peremptory challenges will be exercised on
the basis of race. If few peremptory challenges are racially moti-
vated, then the odds are that any given challenge is not racially
motivated. If there is doubt, therefore, a strike should be upheld.341
This conclusion is buttressed by the third corollary, which holds
that color-consciousness, or bias, is easy to identify Bias will stick
out because it is unusual. Perhaps the logic of the last sentence is
not foolproof, but reasoning from its converse is a prod to the
doubting. Suppose instead that the incidence of bias is rare and
unmarked, something like a churchgoing schoolteacher ax-mur-
derer. In that case, peremptory challenge law falls apart. Because
bias is rare, it cannot be presumed in all cases. Because bias is not
obvious, it usually will be undetectable. Because acknowledging
difference is itself bias, we cannot increase the odds of detecting it
by considering the race of the parties who might harbor bias. Thus
Batson is either a disingenuous charade or an ill-conceived
sinkhole.
Because that progression leads to either despair or cynicism, the
color-consciousness definition requires that bias be assumed to be
evident as well as unusual. Now, if bias probably is harbored by a
few miscreants, whom we can identify, then both the Hernandez
sign-off on facially neutral reasons and the deference it accords the
trial judge become natural, even inevitable. The racially biased at-
torney will not be able to hide her bias behind racially neutral rea-
sons, either because she is so odd she cannot even think of racially
neutral pretexts, or because the judge will recognize the biased at-
torney for the miscreant she is.
This leaves only one problem, beyond the credibility of these
corollaries in the criminal trial context: what if the judge is racially
biased too9 The Batson majority's answer-that we should trust
trial judges to obey the law-is only satisfactory if bias is con-
scious. If bias were sometimes unconscious, then a judge might in
341. The conviction that bias is unusual also could explain the Court's sanguine reliance,
in McCollum, on the restricted voir dire right as a substitute for the defense's use of pe-
remptory challenges. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357. It is the unusual case that prompts the
expression of bias just as it is the unusual person who harbors bias.
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good faith believe she was executing the law, but in fact be approv-
ing the racially biased action of attorneys. A belief that bias is al-
ways conscious also braces the wobbling third corollary- if bias is
conscious, it is more likely to be detectable, particularly by trial
judges, who have some expertise in assessing credibility
There! Maybe we blurred the line a bit between premises and
rationalizations, maybe we called what was really only juryng-
gings42 "architecture" but it's all still standing.
C. Possible Defenses of the Color-Consciousness Conception of
Racial Discrimination
Barbara Underwood posed the question, "whose right is it?" and
sought the most coherent answer from the structure of the decided
cases.3 43 But what an odd edifice the decided cases form; perhaps
it is better to question the edifice. If it does not provide significant
shelter for any of the parties whose rights might be at stake, then
it ought to be remodeled.
1. Color-Consciousness from the Defendant's Perspective
I start with the defendant because her interest in a just outcome,
if implicated, certainly trumps any other interest that might be
put forward. From the defendant's perspective, particularly from
the African American or Latmo defendant's perspective, both the
recent case law and the underlying definition of racial discrimina-
tion as color-consciousness are disastrous.
In Part II, I criticized the recent case law from the defendant's
perspective. To recapitulate briefly, post-Batson case law presents
three negative developments for defendants. First, the doctrine
switches from a focus on the defendant's right to a focus on the
juror's right. Second, the scrutiny of prosecutorial peremptory
challenges becomes limited to a requirement that the prosecutor
credibly assert a race neutral reason, regardless of its persuasive-
ness or disparate impact. Finally, a bar now is imposed on the de-
fendant who openly seeks to obtain a more favorable jury through
the use of racially motivated peremptory challenges.
342. Pun intended. It is altogether too easy to guess whose jury was rigged in this process.
343. Underwood, supra note 11.
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In this setting, the implications of the underlying paradigm of
racial discrimination as color-consciousness are even more dis-
heartening than the case law. In the adjudication of guilt, to
equate racial discrimination with acknowledgement of difference is
so bizarre that it would be hilarious, were it not tragic. Difference
is rampant. To name just a few of the disparities: overall offender
rates are radically different in different ethnic groups, 44 as are
preferred offenses,4 5 victimization rates,346 imprisonment rates,34 7
representation on police forces, 48 and deaths caused by law en-
forcement officials. 49 This information is not a secret; on the con-
trary, public perception of crime often exaggerates existing differ-
ences35" and the media gives disproportionate coverage to minority
participation in crime.35 1 To define racial discrimination as aware-
ness or acknowledgement of difference thus in this context legis-
lates a bald-faced lie; even worse, it blinds the observer to the far
more pressing evil of racial prejudice, or "prejudging." In Batson,
the Court was correct to forbid the assumption that black jurors
were more likely to be "biased" m black defendant cases, 52 but
not because the correct assumption is a race neutral one. The cor-
rect assumption is that white jurors are more likely to be "biased"
in a black defendant case than are black jurors. Of course, from a
prosecutor's perspective, whether one labels the black juror "bi-
ased" in favor of the defendant or the white juror "biased" against
344. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHmE, SEPARATE, HosTIme, UNEQUAL
181-82 (1992).
345. Id. at 181-82, 184.
346. Id. at 183.
347. Id. at 236.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 189.
350. See id. at 187-88; see also Daniel J. Abbott & James M. Calonico, Black Man, White
Woman-The Maintenance of a Myth: Rape and the Press in New Orleans, In CRIME AND
DELNQUENCY: DMIENSIONS OF DEviANCE 141, 147-49 (Marc Riedel & Terence P Thornberry
eds., 1974); Jean-Marie B. Mayas, Perceived Crunmality: The Attribution of Criminal Race
From News-Reported Crime (1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Umversity of
Michigan).
351. See, e.g., Abbott & Calomco, supra note 350, at 147-49; Kirk A. Johnson, Objective
News and Other Myths: The Poisoning of Young Black Minds, 60 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328
(1991); Ellis Cose, Rape in the News: Mainly About Whites, N.Y. TIMEs, May 7, 1989, § 4,
at 27; Ellen J. Pollack & Stephen J. Adler, Justice for All?, Legal System Struggles to
Reflect Diversity, but Progress Is Slow, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1992, at Al, A2.
352. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
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him does not matter; either perception leads him to want to strike
the black juror in a black defendant case. But the difference is cru-
cial, for no defendant is entitled to a jury biased for him and every
defendant is entitled to a jury not biased against him. White jurors
must be deemed biased against black defendants if, in identical
situations, they are more likely to convict a black defendant than a
white defendant.3 53
The evidence that white jurors are in this sense more likely to be
biased in a minority race defendant case is so overwhelming that it
iS ludicrous to proscribe such an assumption. Strauder treats the
validity of that assumption as beyond dispute,354 and as Justice
Thomas said in McCollum, "I do not think that this basic premise
has become obsolete. 3 55 There are many reasons to believe
that assumption -s still valid, beginning, as Justice Thomas did,
with the fact that the public clearly believes that the racial compo-
sition of juries matters. Thomas cited a computer search that
found that the phrase "all-white jury" appeared more than two
hundred times during a five year period in the New York Times,
the Chicago Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times.5 6 One could as
easily cite the Los Angeles riots. Moreover, public perceptions fo-
cus on white bias. In contrast to their views about racial discrimi-
nation in the workplace, most white Americans believe that black
persons suffer discrimination in the criminal justice system.357
It would be surprising if white Americans thought something de-
rogatory about themselves that was not true. It would also be sur-
prising if prosecutors, the on-the-scene experts, wrongly thought
that race of jurors mattered in assessing the guilt of black defend-
ants, and it is absolutely clear that they did think it mattered.
Prior to Batson, prosecutors used peremptory challenges to rid the
jury of black jurors in black defendant cases with overwhelming
353. Bias cannot be judged in the abstract. It makes the most sense to consider the "typi-
cal" adjudication of guilt as the standard for what a fair jury trial means.
354. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880).
355. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
356. Id. at 2360 n.i.
357. Black and White, supra note 9, at 23.
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frequency 3 58 It would also be surprising if defense attorneys were
so vigorously-and, in the Swain era, despite so little
hope-resisting a practice that actually did not disadvantage their
clients.
There is far more evidence than merely the opinions of the pub-
lic and the bar. A cross-disciplinary survey of evidence about white
juries and their evaluation of the guilt of black defendants pro-
vides a large body of data supporting the inference that, for many
white jurors, race is a factor in the determination of guilt.35 9 Trial
data, while not conclusive, point strongly toward the conclusion
that race influences criminal trial outcomes. Several studies of con-
viction rate data find that black defendants are significantly more
likely to be found guilty than are white defendants charged with
the same crime.80 Other conviction rate studies show a decrease in
conviction rates following changes in jury selection procedures that
resulted in the inclusion of more black and Latino jurors. 6 1 Death
penalty studies, including the famous Baldus study reviewed in
McCleskey,s8 2 consistently show that juries that are primarily or
all-white disproportionately impose the death penalty on black of-
fenders with white victims, with the race-of-victim effect being an
358. JON K VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 154-56 (1977); George W. Crockett,
Jr., Racism in the Courts, 20 J. PUB. L. 385, 387 (1971); George Hayden et al., Prosecutorial
Discretion in Peremptory Challenges: An Empirical Investigation of Information Use in
the Massachusetts Jury Selection Process, 13 NEw ENG. L. REV. 768, 790 (1978); Lisa Van
Amburg, Comment, A Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal
Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. Louis U. L.J. 662, 667 (1974); Steve McGonigle & Ed
,Timms, Prosecutors Routinely Bar Blacks, Study Finds, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9,
1986, at Al (finding that in 100 trials in Dallas County in 1983-1984, prosecutors struck 405
of 467 eligible black jurors; five times as many qualified black jurors were struck than white
jurors); see also United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting 15 crimi-
nal cases involving black defendants in which prosecutors struck 81% of black jurors);
United States v. McDamels, 379 F Supp. 1243, 1244-45 (E.D. La. 1976) (noting 53 criminal
cases involving black defendants in which prosecutors used 68.9% of their peremptory chal-
lenges against black jurors, although the venire was less than one quarter black); McKinney
v. Walker, 394 F Supp. 1015, 1017-18 (D.S.C. 1974) (noting 13 criminal trials involving
black defendants in which prosecutors peremptorily challenged 82% of black jurors); People
v. Payne, 457 N.E.2d 1202, 1210-11 (M. 1983) (Simon, J., dissenting) (citing numerous Illi-
noS cases in which prosecutors exercised the peremptory challenge in a racially discrimina-
tory manner).
359. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 1615-50.
360. Id. at 1620-21.
361. Id. at 1621-22.
362. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987).
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extremely important factor. 6 s Considering that sentencing studies
suggest anti-minority bias on the part of at least some white
judges;'" one would expect that a greater proportion of jurors
would be influenced by race. Finally, a comprehensive three year
investigation of the New York courts, commissioned by the Chief
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, found racism to be very
prevalent.36 5
Mock jury studies provide even stronger evidence that racial bias
often affects the determination of guilt. I have reviewed these
studies in some detail elsewhere, ee but I briefly will summarize
their results here. Nine fairly recent experiments find that the race
of the defendant directly and significantly affects the determina-
tion of guilt: white subjects in all of these studies were more likely
to find a minority race defendant guilty than they were to find an
otherwise identical white defendant guilty 367 Studies that fail to
find a direct cause and effect relationship between race of the de-
fendant and guilt attribution frequently have not differentiated be-
tween the responses of white and black subjects. Mixing the re-
sponses probably conceals offsetting tendencies to judge
363. See, e.g., William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination
Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CIME & DELINQ. 563, 578 (1980); Samuel R.
Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital
Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 38-45 (1984); Linda Foley,
The Effect of Race on the Imposition of the Death Penalty (1979)(paper presented at the
meeting of the American Psychological Association in New York, Sept. 1979).
The fact that the Court did not find this kind of evidence sufficient proof that McCleskey
himself would not have been sentenced to death had his victim been black does not dimin-
ish the importance of these findings for jury selection theory. It is not necessary to pinpoint
which defendants have been treated unfairly, but only to note that some are.
364. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 1623-24; Joan Petersilia, Racial Disparities in the
Criminal Justice System: A Summary, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 15, 21-22 (1985) (finding that
judges impose heavier sentences on Latinos and African Americans holding felony severity
and criminal record constant); James D. Unnever & Larry A. Hembroff, The Prediction of
Racial/Ethnic Sentencing Disparities: An Expectation States Approach, 25 J. REs. CRIME
& DELINQ. 53 (1988); Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 Am J.
POL. ScL 126, 127 (1988); cf. Cassia Spohn, The Sentencing Decisions of Black and White
Judges: Expected and Unexpected Similarities, 24 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 1197 (1990) (finding
that both black and white judges treat black defendants more harshly, but hypothesizing
the possibility of different reasoning).
365. Jerry Gray, Panel Says Courts Are "Infested with Racism," N.Y. TIMEs, June 5,
1991, at B1.
366. Johnson, supra note 50, at 1626-34.
367. Id. at 1626.
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defendants of another race as more likely to be guilty, because
most studies investigating minority race subjects have found a pat-
tern of disfavoring white race defendants.36 8 The several studies
that find white subjects more likely to vote for conviction if the
victin is white are also instructive.36 9 These studies indirectly sup-
port the findings that the race of the defendant affects guilt attri-
bution, and they pose the possibility of a cumulative effect of race
of the defendant and race of the victin such that the black defend-
ant accused of victimizing a white person is doubly disadvantaged
by a white jury 370 Moreover, research on race, "attractiveness,"
and blameworthiness reinforces and helps explain the mechanism
through which anti-black bias operates.37 ' White subjects tend to
perceive black faces as less beautiful than white faces, tend to per-
ceive black defendants as coming from a lower socioeconomic class
than otherwise identical white defendants, and tend to assume
greater attitude dissimilarity from black persons. 2 White subjects
are also more likely to judge physically unattractive defendants
guilty, more likely to judge lower class defendants guilty, and more
likely to judge defendants with dissimilar attitudes guilty 3
Finally, general research on the nature of prejudice and its per-
sistence support the conclusion that jury determinations of guilt
are particularly likely to evoke white prejudice. A 1990 survey by
the National Research Opinion Center found that more than half
of all-white respondents said they thought black people were more
prone to violence than white people.3 7 4 Another study showed that
whites' opinions on how honest they perceived black people to be
changed markedly for the worse when the subjects were led to be-
lieve that the researcher had a physiological measure of their true
368. Moreover, two of three studies I reviewed found an interaction between race, guilt
attribution, and a third variable. The third variable may have involved an uninvestigated
offsetting race of the victim effect. Id. at 1631-32.
369. Id. at 1634-35.
370. Id. at 1634.
371. Id. at 1638.
372. Id. at 1640.
373. Id. at 1639.
374. T. Alexander Alemikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance
of Racism, 63 U. CoLo. L. REv. 325, 332 (1992). One might guess that an even greater per-
centage of whites thought so.
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attitude.3 7 5 Of course, jury voir dire contains no such appearance of
a reliability check. White subjects supplied with negative informa-
tion about a person respond more unfavorably when the person is
described as black.37 6 One might therefore expect greater credence
would be given by white jurors to prosecution evidence in cases
involving black defendants than in cases involving white defend-
ants. Conversely, if a person is described as black, white subjects
are less interested in evaluating the other traits that person pos-
sesses,3 77 are less likely to be influenced by other characteristics in
determining that person's likability, 7 s and are less responsive to
positive nonverbal communication from black persons. 7 9 One
would therefore expect that white jurors might overlook cues that
a black defendant's testimony was credible. Negative stereotypes
appear to be triggered with vastly greater frequency when black
people are pictured in stereotypical settings. 80 Jurors might thus
be expected to respond with negative stereotypes of criminality
when observing a black defendant accused of a crime. Moreover, it
has long been understood that socially disapproved prejudice is
most likely to be acted upon when it can be practiced covertly The
complexity of the facts at issue in a jury trial may permit racially
motivated arguments that never allude to race.38 1 Finally, as many
white Americans are quite insensitive to cues of prejudiced behav-
ior in others,8 2 racist behavior by prejudiced jurors may be inac-
cessible even to unprejudiced white jurors.
Thus the evidence of a greater risk that white jurors will be
prejudiced in cases involving black defendants is extraordinarily
strong. When such jurors sit on a black defendant's jury, the harm
375. Harold Sigall & Richard Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading, a Little Fak-
ing, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247, 252 (1971).
376. Patncia W Linville & Edward E. Jones, Polarized Appraisals of Out-Group Mem-
bers, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 689, 689 (1980).
377. HOWARD J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 81-82 (1973); Linville &
Jones, supra note 376, at 689.
378. EHRLICH, supra note 377, at 81-82.
379. Joseph P Forgas & L.B. Brown, The Effects of Race on Observer Judgements of
Nonverbal Communications, 104 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 243, 246-49 (1978).
380. Paul F Secord et al., The Negro Stereotype and Perceptual Accentuation, 53 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 78, 81 (1956).
381. GORDON W ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 56-57 (1954).
382. Steven A. Rollman, The Sensitivity of Black and White Americans to Nonverbal
Cues of Prejudice, 105 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 73 (1978).
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to the defendant is both obvious and potentially extreme, for those
jurors may vote for conviction whereas an unbiased juror would
have voted for acquittal. The color-consciousness model of racial
discrimination in jury selection fails to recognize the harm of ra-
cially biased decisionmaking or, in any significant measure, to pre-
vent this harm. The corollary assumptions about racial
prejudice-that it is rare, obvious and conscious-largely rob the
defendant of even the protection that an unadorned color-con-
sciousness model could have provided. These assumptions, which
underlie both the minimal scrutiny of the prosecutor's reasons in
Hernandez and the assertion in McCollum that the defendant does
not need peremptory challenges to screen out racially biased ju-
rors, are blatantly false. 3
The social science literature documenting the persistence of neg-
ative attitudes toward African Americans is literally overwhelm-
mg.384 Although less evidence exists concerning other racial minor-
ity groups, it is clear they too face substantial prejudice. 3 5 While
"dominative racists," persons who express bigotry and hatred
openly, are less common than they were twenty-five years ago, they
have been replaced, in substantial measure, by closet or "aversive"
racists, persons who continue to hold negative stereotypes of mi-
norities and wish to avoid them. 86 The modern racist recognizes
the formal antidiscrimination norm, and denies racial prejudice,
but given the opportunity, will express racism indirectly and co-
vertly, sometimes without conscious awareness of the racial
383. See supra notes 339-42 and accompanying text.
384. For easily accessible materials that summarize the primary literature, see HOWARD
SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTIuDEs IN AMERICA. TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1985);
Alemikoff, supra note 374; Johnson, supra note 50; Howard Schuman, Changing Racial
Norms in America, 30 MICH. Q. REv. 460 (1991). See generally HACKER, supra note 344
(citing numerous figures and statistics showing the gross social and economic disparities
between black and white society in modem America).
385. See, e.g., HuBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 21 (1982); Jack Lip-
ton, Racism in the Jury Box: The Hispanic Defendant, 5 HisPANic J. BEHAV. ScL 275 (1983);
Tom W. Smith & Glenn R. Dempsey, The Polls: Ethnic Social Distance and Prejudice, 47
PUB. OPINMON Q. 584, 593-94 (1983); J. Solernou, Effects of Ethnic Group Membership and
Attribution of Responsibility 58, 72 (1977) (unpublished dissertation, University of
Kentucky).
386. Sheri L. Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. I'Ev.
1016, 1027-28 (1988).
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prejudice. 8 7 Modern racists do not carry signs, nor are they likely
to engage in uncomfortable introspection.
Peremptory challenge law could be worse for the defendant of
color. Swain was worse-but probably not much worse.
2. Color-Consciousness from the Juror's Perspective
Because litigants have so much more at stake than do jurors,
placing the excluded juror at the center of jury selection law seems
like an odd "misordering of priorities."3 8 Professor Underwood ex-
plains this apparent inversion by claiming that a litigant's stake in
jury selection is "highly speculative," both because the ban on jury
discrimination may not affect the composition of the jury and be-
cause the racial composition of the jury may not affect the ver-
dict.389 As I have argued above, the defendant's stake m the racial
composition of the venire is far less speculative than Professor Un-
derwood asserts. Moreover, the fact that the composition of the
venire may not always be affected by jury selection is irrelevant m
assessing how much weight to give the defendant's interest when
the composition actually is affected. But even if Professor Under-
wood's rationale for discounting the defendant's interest and fo-
cusing on the juror were meritorious, the present structure of jury
discrimination law would be empty, for it is inhospitable to jurors
as well as defendants.
As Professor Underwood acknowledges, many prospective jurors
find jury service onerous. She claims that such jurors are "never-
theless deeply injured by an exclusion based upon race," reasoning
that (1) no one likes to be rejected, even for an onerous task; (2)
when the basis for rejection is race, the injury is compounded; and
(3) when the task is widely understood as a fundamental aspect of
citizenship, as jury service is, then rejection translates into "a judg-
ment of unfitness for citizenship. '"39 0 I doubt that all jurors feel
such injury when excluded on the basis of race. For some jurors,
387. Id., see also TEUN A. VAN Dijx, COMMUNICATING RACISM: ETHNIC PREJUDICE IN
THOUGHT AND TALK (1987) (presenting a cross-cultural study of narratives involving issues
of race).
388. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
389. Underwood, supra note 11, at 745.
390. Id. at 745-46.
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the costs of being a juror are extraordinarily high. A flat assertion
that the psychological pain of being excluded on the basis of race
always outweighs the benefits seems to me either extremely dog-
matic or paternalistic. Moreover, "exclusion on the basis of race" is
too broad a category for assessing whether there is psychological
harm."9 1 Imagine a situation in which a white person who as part of
a largely white venire is challenged by defense counsel for a black
defendant. Even if this person realizes that she is challenged in the
hopes of reaching a black juror, it is hard to believe this person
would translate the exclusion into a "judgment of unfitness for
citizenship." '92
And, even if we were to assume that many excluded jurors would
experience this "deep injury" upon exclusion, post-Batson peremp-
tory challenge law does not do much to prevent such injury From
the juror's perspective, a Swam era challenge looks exactly the
same as an Hernandez era challenge."9 ' Is it really plausible to
think that the Latino jurors in Hernandez did not perceive racial
discrimination? Because Batson hearings are usually done outside
the jury's presence, even the facially neutral reason that placated
the Court is not available to the juror. Underwood might argue
that a juror-focused Batson leads to fewer such injuries, because in
the Swain era the. "truly" racially discriminatory challenge was
permitted. The color-consciousness model that explains the post-
391. I consider briefly a comparison from my own experience with the varied reactions to
discrimination based on an immutable trait. In the 12 years I have taught at Cornell Law
School, the job of "faculty secretary" has always fallen to a male faculty member, generally
a quite junior male faculty member, despite the fact that there have been four entry level
women hired during this period. I am not insulted; I have understood that exclusion to
represent sensitivity to the implications of calling a young female professor a "secretary."'
Another of my female colleagues said she had been unaware of the exclusion. When m-
formed of the various persons who had served m the position, she too inferred discrimina-
tion, but inferred a different, less generous motive for the exclusion and expressed relief
that she had not been asked to serve in the annoying job. A third female colleague said she
had observed the discrimination, seen benigu motives, and was not upset. She also men-
tioned other professional committees that seemed to have practiced the same discrimination
regarding the position of secretary. A variety of emotional responses to "discrimination" are
possible: one might be unaware of discrimination, and thereby feel no pain; one might be
aware but pleased by the discrimination by virtue of the motive ascribed to the discrimia-
tor; or one might be aware, pained by the perceived motive, but nevertheless pleased at the
outcome. Generalization is risky.
392. Underwood, supra note 11, at 746.
393. See supra notes 39-57, 260-77 and accompanying text.
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Batson cases implies, however, that there would have been very
little such discrimination even during the Swain era;394 therefore,
Batson would make very little difference in the number of cases in
which jurors are struck on the basis of race. Moreover, in the small
category of cases in which Batson would invalidate an impermissi-
ble challenge, the harm to the individual juror would remain the
same as it would have been under Swam. Batson does not man-
date reseating the struck jurors. Typically, the trial court, upon
finding a Batson violation, will simply begin jury selection anew or,
if the matter reaches an appellate court, that court will require a
new trial. 39 5 The struck juror is in the same position as under
Swam: walking home with her "deep injury" It is only then, in the
smallest subcategory of cases-those in which the attorney is de-
terred from racially motivated exercises of the peremptory chal-
lenge-that the juror is benefitted, if at all. If that is not "specula-
tive harm," I wonder what is. If that is worth the elaborate Batson
procedure and the thousands of Batson appeals, surely the defend-
ant's "speculative interest" is worth a more searching inquiry
3. Color-Consciusness from the Public's Perspectwe
The third interest cited by the Court as underlying Batson is the
public's interest.3 96 In arguing for recognition of a juror's right to
nondiscrimination, Professor Underwood includes the contention
that the strong public interest in ending race-based jury selection
"helps to explain why it is so important to protect those rights. 39 7
It is unclear why this interest would bolster a juror-based right
more than a defendant-based right. But whether the public inter-
est is support for a defendant's claim or a juror's claim, it can no
better justify the color-consciousness model of jury selection dis-
crimination than can either of the primary interests.
In none of these cases does the Supreme Court discuss the pub-
lic's interest at great length, and for good reason. In McCollum,
the Court refers to perceptions of injustice, citing public unrest
394. This is probably a counterfactual assumption, but one necessary to the color-con-
sciousness model. See supra notes 340-41 and accompanying text.
395. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
396. Id. at 87.
397. Underwood, supra note 11, at 749.
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that occurred upon the exercise of racially motivated peremptory
challenges that produced an all-white jury 9 This line of reason-
mg collides with Hernandez. One hardly suspects that technical
changes in voir dire and jury selection would have mollified the
public. Peremptory challenge law did nothing to mollify the out-
rage m Los Angeles produced by the acquittal of the police officers
accused of beating Rodney King. Such anger is about results, and
the composition of the jury that produced those results. If the
Court had cited the Los Angeles events instead, would it have pro-
hibited a jury composed of no African Americans?
Professor Underwood's argument concerning community interest
is longer, but not better. She first notes that race-based jury selec-
tion may harm the public in several ways. 99 Then she patroniz-
mgly describes the harm:
First, it may operate through racial stereotypes held by mem-
bers of the public. People may believe that an all-white jury will
be biased against a black defendant, or biased in favor of a
white defendant accused of a crime against a black victim.
While these racial stereotypes about jurors cannot properly
serve as the foundation of any legal rule or right, they can never-
theless undermine public confidence in the fairness of verdicts
and thus increase the harm resulting from race-based jury
selection. 00
Thus, according to Professor Underwood, the public is wrong to
feel the way it does, and that allows us to disregard their feelings
when formulating doctrine, but only when we choose to do so. That
public outrage clearly follows both the defendant's and the victim's
interests in the outcome, rather than the jurors' interests in not
being excluded, need not deter us.
Perhaps sensing the awkwardness of this assertion-though not
willing to abandon it-Underwood moves on to the second public
interest: "the proper interest of the public at large," which she
claims does not depend upon "reliance on any such stereotypes. "401
This is the interest in accurate verdicts, an interest that is harmed
398. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992).
399. Underwood, supra note 11, at 748.
400. Id. at 748-49.
401. Id. at 749.
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by the exclusion of a distinct racial group from the jury "not by
virtue of any particular theory about the likely sympathies of the
excluded jurors, but rather because the factfinding process is im-
poverished."40 2 But what would allow us to believe that the
factfinding process is impoverished? Only a belief that members of
different racial groups have-not always, but typically-different
experience and knowledge. 03 Such an assumption is no more race-
neutral or color-blind than the assumption that black jurors-not
always, but typically-will treat the black defendant more fairly
than will white jurors. Both assumptions rely on the "stereotypes"
Underwood claims are impermissible. °4 Moreover, the assump-
tions are related. To the extent black jurors as a group have had
different experiences of racism than white jurors as a group, they
are more likely to differ in their readiness to convict an accused
black defendant. The first example that comes to mind concerns
experiences of police brutality and racial hostility- jurors with
these experiences are likely to view police testimony in resisting
arrest cases with greater skepticism. A second obvious example
concerns the fact that white persons make substantially more er-
rors in identifying people of color than in identifying white peo-
402. Id.
403. Indeed, when she introduced the notion of "impoverished factfinding" earlier in her
article, Professor Underwood cited with approval the following language from the plurality
opinion in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972):
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from
jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human
nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and
perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will
consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion
deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected
importance in any case that may be presented.
Underwood, supra note 11, at 747 (citing Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04).
404. Of course, one may argue that the two stereotypes are different in other ways, that
one is either less likely to be true or more demeaning. Professor Underwood, however, does
not argue that, and the color-consciousness model of discrimination does not seem to permit
such argument. Moreover, the evidence that race affects guilt attribution is far more con-
crete than the. evidence supporting a general claim that racial diversity improves factfinding
through the different experience it brings to the jury box. The second assertion is so general
as to be completely untestable. Finally, while the Swain presumption that black jurors are
less likely to be fair in black defendant cases is a demeaning one, the assumption of
Strauder is not. See infra part IV
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ple.40 5 Black jurors who have had the experience of being mistaken
for another not-so-similar black person 0 6 will view white cross-
racial identification testimony with a more jaundiced eye.
Professor Underwood also claims that the community is harmed
by biased juror selection because "courts that permit race-based
jury selection present themselves to the public as hypocrites" and
because "[tihere is simply no room for race-based exclusions from
the central institutions of representative government: the electo-
rate and the jury ,,407 But precisely the same things could be said
regardless of how we choose to define racial discrimination in jury
selection. These statements are truisms, and certainly could ac-
commodate a much richer understanding of racial discrimination.
Indeed, if the courts are worried about charges of perceived hypoc-
risy and exclusion, Hernandez is to no avail; it merely adds the
charge of disingenuousness.
Moreover, the color-consciousness model completely ignores the
public interest in racially unbiased results just as it ignores the
defendant's interest in racially unbiased results. While the evi-
dence supporting the existence of these two interests largely coin-
cides and has already been summarized,40 8 the interests themselves
are not coextensive. The public interest is broader, for it encom-
passes cases in which the jury selection process threatens the risk
of racial bias not against the defendant, but against the victim.
McCollum presented an opportunity to look at that interest, but
the color-consciousness model precluded its acknowledgment.
Thus, the color-consciousness model of jury selection discrimina-
tion neither accords with public perceptions of justice nor ade-
quately protects the public interest in justice itself.
Thus it is hard to imagine that any of the interested par-
ties-the defendant, the juror, or the public-are well served by
the color-consciousness model of racial discrimination in jury selec-
tion. Remodeling jury selection to fit the color-blindness norm has
led to a bizarre structure; standing but not sturdy, resource-greedy,
405. See Sheri L. Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 COR-
NELL L. REv. 934 (1984).
406. This experience is one which my African American students report is virtually uni-
versal for African Americans.
407. Underwood, supra note 11, at 749-50.
408. See supra notes 344-87, 396-407 and accompanying text.
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and virtually uninhabitable. The color-blindness norm has been
most fully developed in the affirmative action cases, but jury selec-
tion cases are in no sense affirmative action cases. Jury selection is
not about the value of African American role models and whether
or not the benefits to school children outweigh the harm to white
teachers.4"9 It is not about prior discrimination in an industry, or a
society, and how that discrimination may be remedied without ag-
gravating prejudice or inappropriately fixing the costs of that dis-
crimination on a relatively small number of persons.4 10 Nor is it
about an enriching diversity of experiences and information41 in
the public airwaves or the courtroom." 2 Whatever the merits of, or
limits to, the color-blindness norm in the affirmative action con-
text, it should not determine the definition of racial discrimination
in the context of the criminal trial.
IV To SAY RACE
A rose by any other name would smell as sweet, and racial dis-
crimination called Spanish language proficiency is still as odious. It
is not the saying of race, but what we do with it, that causes injury
The trick is not to ban the word "race," or even to ban awareness
of race, but to eliminate race-based harm.
A. An Alternative Conception of Racial Discrimination in Jury
Selection
If we begin the attempt to define "racial discrimination" in the
jury selection context with Strauder, rather than with the intent-
impact distinction of modern equal protection law, a quite differ-
ent conception of racial discrimination emerges. That conception
can still be reconciled with the intent-impact distinction, but it di-
verges radically from the color-consciousness model and its corol-
laries of rare, obvious, and conscious discrimination.
409. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that the school
board's preferential extension of protection against layoffs to minority school teachers vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment).
410. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
411. Professor Underwood, however, might think so.
412. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
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The Court in Strauder found that a statute excluding black peo-
ple from jury service violated the equal protection rights of black
defendants because "[iut is well-known that prejudices often exist
against particular classes in the community, which sway the judg-
ment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to
deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of [the protec-
tion of the laws] which others enjoy ",Is The Court further deter-
mined that exclusion is "a stimulant to that race prejudice which
is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal
justice which the law aims to secure to all others. ' 414 Thus,
Strauder's focus was on justice and the way that racial prejudice
impedes justice. It is not the appearance of injustice or the psycho-
logical pain of exclusion or the existence of stereotypes that consti-
tutes the harm of racial discrimination in jury selection; it is ra-
cially biased results.
Such a definition of the threatened harm implies not the ex-
traordinariness of racial discrimination, but its frequency It does
not censure perceptions of difference about black and white jurors
and their likely biases, but acknowledges them. This is not to say
that all assumptions of difference are permissible. For example,
the Court in Strauder explicitly prohibited the assumption that
African Americans are unfit to be jurors.415 Moreover, Strauder did
not endorse the same perception about differences that Swain later
did, for Swain permitted the assumption that black jurors are
more likely to be biased in black defendant cases than are white
jurors;418 Strauder assumed the contrary, that black jurors are less
likely to be biased.
The assumptions that are forbidden the state, and the Court, are
those assumptions that increase the likelihood that juror bias will
affect the adjudication of the defendant's guilt. Which assumptions
increase that likelihood is not a question that abstract logic can
answer; only an examination of social reality can do that. The spe-
cific assumption that Strauder makes-that the total exclusion of
413. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880) (emphasis added).
414. Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
415. Id. at 307, 310.
416. See Swam v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
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black jurors from black defendant cases is likely to increase the
risk of racially biased adjudications-is still valid today 41 7
When we begin with Strauder, the answer to the question of
"whose right is it?" flows from Strauder's conception of the harm
at stake rather than an attempt to discern a pattern from the most
recent cases. The defendant's right to racially unbiased results is
primary But the defendant's right is not the only right at stake,
for sometimes a defendant will benefit from racial bias in the adju-
dication of guilt. The victim, and the larger community also have a
very large stake in the outcome, and a right to racially unbiased
determinations of guilt.4 18 The juror does not have such a claim.
While a citizen's general equal protection right to nondiscrimina-
tory treatment does not vanish at the jury box, the juror has no
special right that flows from the risk of biased adjudications of
guilt.
The Strauder conception of racial discrimination has one obvi-
ous and inescapable implication for peremptory challenge law:
race-based exclusinary strikes are forbidden. When the defendant
is a member of a racial minority and the prosecutor strikes a po-
tential juror who is a member of that racial minority in order to
have no persons of that race on the panel or, if that is not possible,
to decrease the number of persons of that race to less than half,
that is racial discrimination. In most parts of the country, then,
the prosecutor does not engage in impermissible racial discrimina-
tion (at least in the Strauder sense) 419 when striking a white juror,
regardless of the race of the defendant or victims, even when the
prosecutor's motive is to decrease the number of white persons on
the panel. This is so because the risk of racial bias is either de-
417. See supra part III.B.
418. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107-08 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (sug-
gesting that the defendant's exercise of the peremptory challenge may cause "prejudice
against his prosecution").
419. Of course, the juror might have an ordinary equal protection claim, but it should not
prevail when the prosecutor's practice increases the likelihood of a racially just outcome.
The interests on the other side of the balance outweigh the juror's right or, to put it differ-
ently, the strict scrutiny standard is met. If the prosecutor strikes a juror on the basis of
race where the likelihood of racial justice is not furthered by the strike-for example, strik-
ing a black juror in a white defendant/white victim case in the belief that black jurors are
more acquittal prone-then that strike is unjustifiable discrimination against the black
juror.
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creased or unaltered by the prosecutor's actions. Thus, if the pros-
ecutor in McCollum had attempted to increase the likelihood that
some black persons would serve on McCollum's jury, this would
not have been discrimination according to Strauder Of course, if
the panel is predominantly black, the conclusion in a white defend-
ant case would be different, because removing white persons might
well increase the likelihood of a racially biased adjudication. While
the phenomenon of anti-white bias on the part of black jurors is
less well-established than the phenomenon of anti-black bias on
the part of white jurors, it too has substantial empirical support.420
The challenges by defense attorneys are subject to the same
analysis. These challenges constitute racial discrimination when
the defense attorney intends to increase the risk of a racially bi-
ased adjudication of guilt. Thus, when the defense attorney at-
tempts to use peremptory challenges to prevent all persons who
differ racially from the defendant from sitting on the jury or,
where that is not possible, to decrease the number of racially dif-
ferent persons to less than half of the panel, the attorney has en-
gaged in jury discrimination. When defense peremptory challenges
are used to increase the likelihood that some members of the de-
fendant's race will sit on the defendant's jury (but not dominate it)
there is no jury discrimination. Under this model, the distinction
advanced by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund amicus brief in Mc-
Collum is correct: "whether white defendants can use peremptory
challenges to purge minority jurors presents quite different issues
from whether a minority defendant can strike majority group
jurors.' 4 21
Thus, Strauder leaves us with a far more contextualized view of
what constitutes racial discrimination in jury selection. I am sure
there are several possible articulations of this view, but here is a
rough definition: racial discrimination in jury selection is any jury
selection practice that is intended to increase the likelihood that
racial bias will influence the outcome of a particular criminal trial.
Such a definition (hereinafter referred to as "the Strauder model")
420. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 1625-40, 1696-97.
421. Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., at *5, Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (No. 91-372) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs file) (sug-
gesting reversal).
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is not inconsistent with the intent standard, because it aims at
"because of" rather than "in spite of' discrimination on the part of
jurors, and intentional free-riding on that bias by courts and
attorneys.
B. Possible Implications of the Strauder Model
A Strauder-inspired definition of racial discrimination in jury
selection poses the question of how to determine whether a selec-
tion practice is intended to increase the likelihood that bias will
affect an outcome. Such a definition also leaves open the question
of when the state is implicated in the racial discrimination it de-
fines and, thus, when such discrimination is constitutionally
prohibited.
1. The "Breadth" of Strauder Model Discrimination
Professor Underwood rejects a defendant-based theory of jury
selection rights in large part because she thinks that "the theory
that race-based jury selection produces a jury that decides a case
in a racially biased manner" ultimately implies that "every white
juror should be excluded as biased and the black defendant should
be tried by an all-black jury ",422 Observing that the Court always
has refused to order juries of any particular racial composition and,
more recently has refused to grant retroactive effect to Batson,
reasoning that it does not have "a fundamental impact on the in-
tegrity of factfinding,"42 5 she concludes that the Court, therefore,
has rejected the underlying theory-and so rejects it herself. As I
noted earlier in this Article, I think this reasoning is backward.
One starts with life, not law, and with experience, not logic, at
least when the two so violently conflict.424
The assertion that acknowledging the prevalence of racial bias
will lead to the cliff of all-black juries is simply incorrect, as is the
refusal to acknowledge the prevalence of bias for fear of going over
the edge. First, acknowledging the prevalence of racial bias does
422. Underwood, supra note 11, at 730.
423. Id. at 731 (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986)).
424. "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." OLIVER W. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Moreover, the "logic" of the law runs both from the cases cited
by Professor Underwood and from Strauder
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not mean that every race-based jury selection procedure actually
produces a jury that decides a case in a racially biased manner, nor
does it mean that every white juror should be excluded as biased.
So far as I can tell, no commentator has asserted that Strauder, or
the empirical evidence on race and guilt adjudication, supports a
claim that all white jurors are biased in black defendant cases or
that no black jurors are biased in such cases. Rather, the argument
and the evidence is that white jurors, as a group, are .more likely to
be biased against black defendants.
Such a perspective does not compel the conclusion that black
defendants get all-black juries. Nothing, not even an all black jury,
can assure the black defendant of a racially unbiased adjudication
of her guilt. In a racist society, no group is a completely safe har-
bor 'from racial prejudice; some black persons also discriminate
against black people.425 It is a matter of probabilities, as it always
is when the impartiality of a particular jury is at stake, regardless
of whether or not race is an issue. We never know that a particular
jury will judge the defendant's guilt impartially, but we do know
that some juries are more likely than others to do so. Any "rem-
edy" for the risk of racial bias, short of prohibiting all criminal
convictions, is therefore, inevitably, the result of some trade-offs.
A variety of different trade-offs are possible within the Strauder
model. One way of cataloging the possibilities is through state ac-
tion doctrine. But even the most expansive plausible vision of state
action doctrine is unlikely to lead to the conclusion of all-black
juries from the premise of the Strauder conception of racial dis-
crimination m jury selection. If the state simply fails to affirma-
tively mandate all-black juries, how has it intended to increase the
likelihood that racial bias will influence the outcome of a particular
trial?426 Moreover, it is hard for me to see how the Strauder model
425. Some members of minority groups "respond to discrimination and prejudice by at-
tempting to disassociate themselves from the group, even to the point of adopting the ma-
jority's negative attitudes toward the minority." Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503
(1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing to sociological studies regarding minorities and mi-
nority groups' means of acclimating themselves to the "dominant," i.e., white, society).
426. i suppose one could argue that the state is aware that an all-black jury would in-
crease the likelihood of a racially unbiased adjudication of guilt and that it could mandate
such a jury. But this ignores two parts of the Strauder conception of jury selection discrimi-
nation. First, Strauder discrimination requires that the practice increase the level of bias. A
refusal to revamp the jury system completely can hardly be characterized as an increase
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would even lead to a requirement that some black jurors sit on
black defendants' juries. I have made the argument elsewhere that
the Constitution should be read to require a minimum of three mi-
nority race jurors in minority race defendant cases, 427 and I do not
retreat from that argument. But that argument does not follow
from the Strauder intent-to-increase-the-likelihood-of-racial-bias
theory of jury selection discrimination. Rejection of its conclusion
therefore demonstrates little about which model of jury selection
discrimination to embrace.
If the state action requirement is read narrowly, a Strauder-
based conception of jury discrimination would prohibit only
prosecutorial strikes aimed at eliminating persons of the defend-
ant's race from her jury, or reducing the number of such persons
below half the number on the jury For defendants of color or,
more precisely, defendants whose race is in a minority in the com-
munity in which they will be tried, the Strauder model, even with
this narrow conception of state action, would be an improvement
over the color-consciousness model. It would be better because
"minority" defendants would be free to use their peremptory chal-
lenges to try to increase the number of persons of their own race
sitting on their juries. It would also be better because, for reasons I
shall address shortly, the Strauder model encourages a more
searching inquiry of why prosecutors use peremptory challenges to
eliminate "minority" jurors. Moreover, "minority" victims would
benefit because prosecutors would be permitted to try to increase
the representation of "minority" jurors on a panel trying a case
involving a defendant who is a member of a majority group and a
victim who is a member of a minority group.
The public interest in racial justice also would be served by
these changes. The only loss to the public from the change in mod-
els would arise in the cases in which "majority" defendants were,
under the more restricted view of state action, permitted to try to
strike all or more "minority" jurors to achieve a jury biased in
over any situation that plausibly might be considered the starting point of the analysis.
Second, Strauder discrimination requires an intent to increase the risk of racial bias. Cer-
tainly the pedigree of, and values underlying, the representative jury renders credible the
assertion that the state resists the innovation of the all-black jury in spite of, rather than
because of, its effects on racial bias.
427. Johnson, supra note 50, at 1695-1700.
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their favor. This, of course, is not a loss due to the Strauder model,
but due to a more restricted conception of state action than pres-
ently governs jury selection cases.
Indeed, I think adoption of a Strauder model of jury selection
discrimination renders the broad view of state action in jury selec-
tion vastly more attractive. The drawbacks cited by Justices
O'Connor and Thomas would no longer be present, for minority
defendants would become free to use their peremptory challenges
to increase minority representation on the jury Although strikes
by the defense attorney would constitute state action, they would
not be forbidden. Such strikes are not Strauder discrimination be-
cause they do not attempt to increase the likelihood that racial
bias will influence the outcome of that particular trial. On the
other hand, defense attorney strikes in a situation like that in
McCollum would be forbidden, because a defense attorney's at-
tempt to rid the jury of black jurors in a white defendant/black
victim case is an attempt to increase the likelihood that racial bias
would influence the determination of guilt in that particular case.
Innocent defendants, true victims, and the public, all gain from
this alternative conception of racial discrimination. I do not think
the losses incurred by those who benefit from increasing the likeli-
hood that racial discrimination will influence a particular verdict
should weigh against a switch. Thus, the only interest left to con-
sider is that of the juror.
The Strauder model would subjugate the juror's interest in not
being struck on the basis of race to the interests of the defendant,
the victim, and the public in unbiased adjudications of guilt. Nev-
ertheless, I think the Strauder model of jury selection discrimina-
tion is more beneficial to jurors as a group than is the color-con-
sciousness model that now holds sway. In part, this is because the
points of actual conflict are relatively few and typically less injuri-
ous to jurors than the protected instances. Thus, under a Strauder
model, the strike of a majority juror designed to increase the repre-
sentation of the minority, whether by the defense or the prosecu-
tion, does not constitute jury selection discrimination. It is hard
for me to imagine, however, that the juror suffers "deep injury" in
such a case; first, because it is unlikely that the juror will even
recognize the strike as racial discrimination and, second, because
she hardly can construe it as a statement of her racially deter-
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mined unfitness for jury duty, or citizenship, or anything else,
given that the majority of the jury will be composed of persons of
her race.428 The reason that these relatively small losses to jurors
do not support-even weakly-the prevailing color-consciousness
model is because jurors, like defendants, victims, and the public,
would gain from another change implied by a theory of racial dis-
crimination in jury selection that is animated by concern for racial
justice.
2. The Depth of Strauder Model Discrimination
A concern for racial justice roughly translates into a prohibition
against racially exclusionary strikes. This definition, like the pre-
vailing one, poses the question of how to identify forbidden strikes.
How to approach that question, though not its precise answer, can
be inferred from the conception of discrimination.
Strauder's sensitivity to the prevalence of racial prejudice, and
its focus on the way that prejudice translates into unequal justice,
suggests an approach to the identification of prohibited discrimina-
tion that does not proceed by formal deduction from premises
(such as the premise of no differences) but begins with an exami-
nation of the realities of prejudice. At the very least this means
considering the prevalence, covertness, and even unconsciousness
of much modern prejudice.429 One could not start with a Strauder
model of discrimination and get to Hernandez, at least not in this
culture.
Where might such a model lead? Certainly it would prompt
closer scrutiny; demeanor evidence would be treated less deferen-
tially, and a heavier weight would be placed on the racially dispa-
428. Moreover, if the attorney was not acting to increase the likelihood of an unbiased
determination, I suppose the juror still might raise a garden variety equal protection claim:
that a governmental action was taken on the basis of her race. Thus, if the prosecutor struck
a black juror in a white victim/white defendant case under the theory that black jurors are
simply more prone to acquit than are white jurors, there would be no jury discrimination
violation, but the juror could still make an ordinary claim of racial discrimination. Because
the prosecutor would not have the justification of attempting to increase the likelihood of a
fair determination of guilt, she would prevail-if it was worth it for her to raise the claim,
which I doubt. If the relevant third party standing doctrine is left intact, the defendant
might be permitted to raise that claim too, but I suspect that a Strauder redefinition of the
jury selection right would take some of the wind from the third party standing sail.
429. See supra notes 344-87 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35:21
1993] LANGUAGE AND CULTURE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 91
rate impact of any stated justification. Such a model also might
lead to a closer examination of particular racial groups, inquiry
into the characteristics that have traditionally been used to justify
discrimination against them, 30 and consideration of the dynamics
of prejudice in a particular community Arguably such particulari-
zation and skepticism would be costly, but at least we would get
something in return for the costs incurred. Defendants, victims,
and the community would reap the concrete gain of more racially
just results as well as the concomitant psychological gain of believ-
ing that the courts actually were attempting to dispense justice.
Even jurors would feel the injury of being struck for apparently
racial reasons less frequently. But if such an individualized inquiry
is too labor or time intensive, the Strauder model could lead us to
a vastly more efficient version of Batson hearings.
To make peremptory challenge law truly congruent with venire
selection law, as Batson purports to do, we could add the gloss of
later venire selection cases. The bottom line in those cases is that
the venire must reflect the community, unless the state can present
a powerful explanation for why it does not. Flimsy reasons, even if
sincere, are not enough to rebut a prima facie case.4 l This rule
might be interpreted in the peremptory challenge stage to mean
that prima facie cases are the only inquiry, because, by definition,
no powerful reason supports a peremptory challenge. 43 2 Thus, one
bright-line rule might be that, regardless of motivation, any combi-
nation of challenges that increases the likelihood that racial bias
will influence the outcome of a particular trial is impermissible.
One might object that this moves the traditional line distinguish-
mg between intent and effect, but, in response, it must be observed
430. This Article has moved, seemingly obliviously, from discrimination against African
Americans to discrunmination against Latinos to generalizations about discrimination against
minorities. Actually, I have not been so much oblivious to, as ignorant of, what may be
relevant differences. A Strauder model of jury discrmination argues for far greater sensitiv-
ity and refinement.
431. See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598-99 (1935) (finding the state's burden
of proof was not met by the jury commissioner's statements that he did not know any quali-
fied African Americans).
432. Challenges with powerful reasons that support them are challenges for cause. Inau-
guration of such a new rule might lead to a broader definition of challenges for cause which,
within limits, probably would be desirable in itself.
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that the Court already has moved that line in the venire selection
cases.
A slightly weaker form of this rule is also possible. If challenges
for cause are too stiff a standard, the proponent of a strike with
racially exclusionary effects could be required to justify that strike
with evidence that the "justification" for that strike was a juror
characteristic or response that routinely prompts peremptory chal-
lenges regardless of the race of the juror, defendant, or victim.
While this weaker form is less attractive because it is less clear,
more susceptible to false claims, and more labor intensive than the
first proposed rule, it would still be better on all of those grounds
than the color-consciousness model of Hernandez.
Undoubtedly, other possibilities exist. Each would involve its
own balancing of the risk of racial bias against other costs. Even if
a Strauder model of jury discrimination were to be adopted, the
Court might not reach an optimal balance, but at least it would
have the right things on the scale.
V CONCLUSION
In theory, "separate but equal" could have been a true charac-
terization of race relations; maybe in some other world such a char-
acterization was or is true. But in America, it has never been true,
and any examination of concrete reality would have exposed its
falsity Sixty years of judicial assertions that it could be true, and
should be true, did nothing to make it true.
Likewise, one can imagine many possible ways that an immuta-
ble characteristic could function in guilt adjudications, but such
possibilities are not the question. In our culture, to look at race
and criminal justice is not to see sameness, but difference. To pro-
scribe racial discrimination in the jury selection is not to proscribe
color-consciousness, but prejudice and, indeed, subordination. To
say equality, therefore, is not to say formality, but fairness. It has
always been so. Would that it were not. But until the day it is not,
jury selection law should seek fairness for those vulnerable to ra-
cial prejudice. Fairness, in this context, comes from inclusion. How
much inclusiveness we are willing to pay for can be argued, but
arguments that racial inclusiveness is irrelevant to fairness in crim-
inal trials should be sent to the same graveyard that now inters
"separate but equal."
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